



Environmental and Technology Policy Options in the Electricity Sector: Interactions and Outcomes

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June, 2012



Policy background

- Economists generally advocate pricing emissions as the most efficient way to get greenhouse gas reductions
- Yet we observe a great diversity of policies — many of which are aimed directly at technology
 - Renewable production subsidies
 - Renewable portfolio standards
 - Clean energy standards
 - R&D subsidies
 - Energy efficiency programs
- Not clear to what extent intended as substitutes or complements – or how effective they are

EU “20/20/20 by 2020” Goals






Figure 3 | Regional Cap-and-Trade Programs





Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT US) Version 4.0. (Washington, DC: World Resources Institute, 2011).

State RPS Programs

www.dsireusa.org / May 2012



 Renewable portfolio standard
 Renewable portfolio goal



Minimum solar or customer-sited requirement



RESOURCES
FOR THE FUTURE

**29 states +
DC and PR have
an RPS**
(8 states have goals)

Combining Renewable Policies with a Cap-and-Trade System

- *With a binding cap, zero incremental emissions reductions are realized from supplementary policies.*
- Renewable energy subsidies cause allowance prices to fall
 - Tends to benefit dirtier emitters!
 - i.e., coal-fired save more than natural gas-fired
 - Less fossil energy generation overall
 - Displaced by RES-E
- Also cause electricity prices to fall
 - Lowers incentives for energy efficiency

Multiple Market Failures

- Emissions externality
- Knowledge market failure – inability of innovators to appropriate all the gains
 - R&D spillovers
 - LBD spillovers
- Energy efficiency demand failure
 - Apparent undervaluation of EE investments

Basic Model

- Partial equilibrium model of electricity supply and demand with representative sectors
 - Upward-sloping supply curves
- Mature technologies
 - Coal
 - Natural gas (conventional and combined cycle)
 - Nuclear (fixed in 1st stage)
 - Hydro (baseload)
- Innovating technologies
 - Conventional renewable (“wind”)
 - Advanced renewable (“solar”)

Two Stages

- Stage 1 (2015-2020)
 - Production
 - R&D and learning-by-doing for renewables
 - Short- and long-run EE improvements
- Stage 2 (2020-2035)
 - Production
 - Cost-reducing knowledge application for renewables
 - Short-run EE improvement
 - With discounting, 2nd stage ~ 10 years

Knowledge Accumulation

- Stock of knowledge lowers renewable costs
- A function of:
 - Cumulative R&D, requiring investment costs
 - Cumulative production (LBD)
 - Differs by technology
- Benefits are appropriated according to factor ρ
 - Spillovers present when $\rho < 1$

Electricity Demand

- A function of
 - Price
 - Rate of electricity consumption per unit of energy services, which is a function of
 - Short-run EE improvements
 - Long-run EE improvements
 - Very short-run elasticity
- Valuation rate for EE improvements, $\beta_j \leq 1$
- Increasing investment costs


Optimal Policy is a Combination

1. Carbon price
 - rising according to the discount factor
2. Subsidies for LBD in the first stage
 - to correct for learning spillovers for each technology
3. R&D subsidy
 - equal to the R&D spillover rate
4. Subsidy to EE investments
 - to offset the unvalued share of EE benefits, both in the short and long term

Numerical Application to U.S. Electricity Sector


- Simulations based on analytical model
- Linear supply curves
- Parameters and baseline values calibrated to EIA 2011 AEO
- Knowledge functions calibrated to literature on R&D and learning curves
- Targeted demand elasticities to very short, short, and long-run estimates from literature

Supply Curves in Baseline Scenario



Baseline Generation

kWh/year



No-Policy Baseline

	Stage 1	Stage 2
Price of electricity (P_t) ($\text{\$/kWh}$)	8.8	9.0
Electricity demand (D_t) (kWh/yr)	4.33×10^{12}	4.81×10^{12}
Coal generation (q_t^x) (kWh/yr)	1.83×10^{12}	2.09×10^{12}
Natural gas generation from boilers and turbines (q_t^{ng}) (kWh/yr)	3.34×10^{11}	3.87×10^{11}
Combined cycle natural gas generation (q_t^{cc}) (kWh/yr)	7.15×10^{11}	7.53×10^{11}
Nuclear generation (q_t^{nu}) (kWh/yr)	8.53×10^{11}	8.77×10^{11}
Wind generation (q_t^w) (kWh/yr)	2.57×10^{11}	3.52×10^{11}
Solar generation (q_t^s) (kWh/yr)	1.66×10^{10}	1.89×10^{10}
Hydro generation (q_t^{h20}) (kWh/yr)	3.19×10^{11}	3.26×10^{11}
Wind share of generation (%)	5.95	7.32
Solar share of generation (%)	0.38	0.39
CO ₂ emissions (E_t) (billion metric tons CO ₂ /year)	2.29	2.59
Rate of wind cost reduction (%)	9%	—
Rate of solar cost reduction (%)	30%	—

Policy	Emissions price		Optimal policy combination	
	No EE failures	10% EE undervaluation	No EE failures	10% EE undervaluation
	$\beta = 1$	$\beta = 0.9$	$\beta = 1$	$\beta = 0.9$
Emissions reduction target		20%	20%	20%
Emissions price, 1 (t1) (\$/ton CO ₂)		11.2	10.3	8.0
Emissions price, 2 (t2) (\$/ton CO ₂)		24.8	22.8	17.8
Learning subsidy (wind) 1 (¢/kWh)			.33	0.30
Learning subsidy (solar) 1 (¢/kWh)			0.63	0.57
R&D subsidy (wind)			50%	50%
R&D subsidy (solar)			50%	50%
EE subsidy 1 (b_{S1}, b_{L1})			0%	10%
EE subsidy 2 (b_{S2}, b_{L1})			0%	10%
Price 1 (% change from baseline)		8.3%	7.4%	4.9%
Price 2 (% change from baseline)		16.7%	14.8%	9.9%
% Renewables 1		8.0%	8.4%	8.0%
% Renewables 2		11.6%	12.8%	12.0%
% EE red 1		2.3%	2.1%	3.9%
% EE red 2		5.7%	5.1%	8.3%
Δ Welfare	-4.37	-2.47	-3.84	-1.57
Δ W (relative to emissions price alone)		—	-12%	-36%


Single Policy Levels to Achieve 20% Reduction

	Emissions Price (\$/ton CO ₂)	Emissions Performance Standard (ton CO ₂ /GWh)	Fossil Fuel Tax (¢/kWh)	Clean Energy Standard (%)	Renewable Portfolio Standard (%)	Renewable Production Tax Credit (¢/kWh)	EE Subsidy (%)
Stage1	11.2	485	1.40	46.8	11.2	4.08	30% short run 48% long run
Stage2	24.8	430	3.10	52.4	21.6	9.05	30%

Like
emission price
+ generation
subsidy

Like
subsidy to
qualifying sources
+ generation tax

Welfare Effects of Single Policies Relative to Emissions Price Alone



Second-Best Combination Policies: RPS

- RPS that maximizes welfare with an emissions cap is only 0.4 – 0.5% above reference scenario
 - Learning externality relatively small
- Exacerbates EE undervaluation, since modest RPS lowers electricity prices
 - With 10% undervaluation, no RPS improves cost-effectiveness


Second-Best Combination Policies: EE Standards

- With no undervaluation, welfare decreasing
 - Also because it lowers electricity prices, exacerbating the knowledge market failure
- With 10% undervaluation, second-best EE standards close to the optimal improvements
 - But the required subsidies are lower, due to the absence of the renewable energy technology policies, which would otherwise keep electricity prices lower.


More Ambitious Combinations

- EU 20/20/20 policy
 - 20% emissions reduction
 - 20% RPS
 - 20% improvement in EE

Sensitivity of Cost of Cap versus 20/20/20 Targets to EE Undervaluation



Sensitivity of Cost of Cap versus 20/20/20 Targets to Knowledge Spillovers



Variations

- Optimal R&D policy cuts costs in half
- Double credits for solar lowers costs somewhat but not substantially.
- More stringent emissions target increases optimal renewable subsidies but still small

Conclusions

- Some technology policies can complement emissions pricing for reducing GHGs when additional market failures are present
- However, these justifiable policies are likely to be much more modest than the suite of renewable energy policies being proposed.
 - Even with high rates of knowledge spillovers from learning by doing, ambitious RPSs seem unlikely to be welfare enhancing.
 - Correcting R&D market failures has greater potential for reducing costs

Conclusions (2)

- The desirability of stringent EE policies very sensitive to the degree of undervaluation.
 - Priority for empirical work
- Even with more refined representations of electricity markets & failures, emissions pricing still the single most cost-effective option
- Technology policies are very poor substitutes, and when they overreach, they can be poor complements too.

Thanks!

- Funding from US EPA-STAR and the Mistra Foundation Indigo program is gratefully acknowledged.



About RFF

- Independent, nonpartisan, nonprofit research institute in Washington, DC
- Founded in 1952
- Our mission:
To improve environmental and natural resource policymaking worldwide through objective social science research of the highest caliber.

