

Offensive and Defensive Analysis of Behavioral Biometrics on Smart Wearables

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
VULNERABILITIES: TRADITIONAL PASSWORD/ PIN/TOKEN-based AUTHENTICATION SYSTEMS

- PINs and Passwords may be forgotten or stolen
- Susceptible to different attacks such as phishing attack, dictionary attack, shoulder surfing, side-channel attack, replay attack, forgery attack such as key loggers, etc.
- Traditional authentication systems performs entry point authentication which can lead to security threats such as session hijacking [1], etc.

Example of Side-channel Attack



Adversary's view of a target user while the user types on the virtual keyboard in an immersive VR environment on Oculus Quest.



Experimental Results: Plotting of the click location data and mapping it to the keyboard geometry for inferring the typed characters.

BIOMETRICS CLASSIFICATION

BIOMETRICS

PHYSIOLOGICAL

FINGERPRINT



IRIS



FACE



BEHAVIORAL

VOICE



Hand-Gestures



EEG



CONS: PHYSIOLOGICAL BIOMETRICS

- Physiological biometrics such as fingerprints and iris can be acquired stealthily and are susceptible to some attacks similar to those of the traditional authentication systems
- Requires an additional step to verify the liveness of the person

SHORTCOMINGS OF EXISTING RESEARCH

- **Pre-defined tasks** leading to mimicry attacks
- Examples of pre-defined tasks: Typing defined text, perform arithmetic operations, etc.
- **Unobtrusive tasks:** Takes user's time away from their work to perform authentication

OUR WORK



Light-weight

Low-cost

BEHAVIORAL BIOMETRICS-based CONTINUOUS AUTHENTICATION

- Continuous Authentication (CA): Verifies user continuously to overcome attacks such as session hijacking
- Behavioral Biometrics such as EEG is hard to be stolen and spoofed [2]
- EEG satisfies liveness criteria [3]

1. Temporal Memory-based CA [5]:

- Unobtrusive Task.
- Does not take time away from the user's work
- *Feature Temporalization:*


$$v_{f_{new}} = [v_{f_1} \parallel v_{f_2} \parallel v_{f_3} \parallel \dots \parallel v_{f_n}]$$

where temporalized feature: $v_{f_{new}}$

and feature at previous time stamp: v_{f_n}

2. Concealable Biometrics-based CA [4]:


- Authenticates user unobtrusively using electroencephalogram (EEG) signals
- Learns the user's unique biometric signature based on his/her brain activity.
- Optimal feature subset is constructed using a minimal number of EEG electrodes/channels



Channels of Emotiv Device

Illustration of the Placement of EEG Electrodes on the user's head is shown in the Channels of Emotiv Device figure. Electrode locations that Contributed in Optimal Features Subset are Highlighted with Green Color

3. Emotion-invariant CA:



- Train the model while the user is in any of the emotional state
- Verify the user irrespective of the emotional state the user is

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2. J. Galbally, S. Marcel, and J. Fierrez. Image quality assessment for fake biometric detection: Application to iris, fingerprint, and face recognition. IEEE Transactions on Image Processing, 23(2):710-724, 2014.
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