Use of the Insanity Defense: A

Running head: INSANITY DEFENSE

Use of the Insanity Defense:

A Survey of Attorneys in Wyoming

George L. Blau and Hugh McGinley

University of Wyoming

Author Note

George L. Blau, Ph.D., J.D., Department of Psychology.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to George L. Blau, Professor of Psychology, Department of Psychology, Box 3415 - University Station, University of Wyoming, Laramie, Wyoming, 82071-3415. Electronic mail: geoblau@uwyo.edu.

A version of this paper was published:

Blau, G.L. & McGinley (1995). Use of the Insanity Defense: A Survey of Attorneys in Wyoming. Behavioral Sciences and the Law. 13, 517-528.

Abstract

Attorneys in the State of Wyoming were surveyed to determine their reported use of the insanity defense during the preceding five years. They were asked about the success, defined as “benefit to the defendant,” of the insanity defense at various stages that occur before trial. The attorneys reported that the insanity defense is used throughout the various stages preceding trial, with more use and benefit to the defendant being reported than previously suggested. This was particularly true for the earlier stages in the criminal justice process. The attorneys were also asked various attitudinal questions related to the insanity defense. Defense lawyers were more in favor of the insanity defense and expressed attitudes that supported the insanity defense while prosecuting attorneys were relatively more opposed to the insanity defense and expressed attitudes consistent with this view.

Use of the Insanity Defense:

A Survey of Attorneys in Wyoming

There is a great deal of misunderstanding about the use and success of the insanity defense (Blau, McGinley, & Pasewark, 1993; Blau & Pasewark, 1994; Perlin, 1990, 1994). As one example, contrary to popular wisdom and the impression gained from the notoriety of infamous trials, the insanity plea is seldom used as a defense at trial and when used is seldom successful (Blau & Pasewark, 1994; McGinley & Pasewark, 1989; Pasewark & McGinley, 1985; Pasewark, Pantle, & Steadman, 1979; Perlin 1990, 1994). While this use of the plea at trial is clearly helpful, it may lead to an overlooking of the possible effects of the defense at other stages of the criminal justice system during which most cases are resolved.

Archives can be examined to determine the number of cases in which the insanity plea was used and the outcome of this defense (e.g., Callahan, McGreevy, Cirincione, & Steadman, 1992; Callahan & Steadman, 1990; Silver, Carmen, & Steadman, 1994). However, archival studies fail to account for cases where the insanity defense may have been addressed but was not entered officially into case records. More importantly, archival studies fail to account for those cases in which the insanity defense could result in the ultimate disposition or sentence being of greater benefit to the defendant.

Few cases result in trial (Monahan & Loftus, 1982) and there may be a number of cases in which the insanity defense is a factor in resolving the case but for which there is no formal reference to it in the records. This can be determined by surveying both prosecuting and criminal defense attorneys to determine the use of the insanity defense as a factor in negotiated dispositions. In negotiation, all information is weighed by the parties involved and they reach an agreement that is perceived to be mutually beneficial. Doubts about proving one or more critical elements are likely to motivate a resolution. Thus the plea of Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity (NGRI), or even a reference to its use by the defense, might lead to an agreement that the defendant will plead to a lesser crime or have the prosecution agree to probation.

Several studies have offered insight into this use of the insanity plea. Roesch and Golding (1978) interviewed defense attorneys who had referred their clients for competency evaluations. Many of the attorneys desired information that later could be used in negotiated dispositions, obtaining dismissal of the charges, or in reducing sentences. Over one-half of the defense attorneys requested treatment recommendations and sentencing alternatives from the competency evaluator. The information gained was unrelated to the original competency request and was intended to be used to benefit their clients with other than a successful plea of NGRI at trial.

Slobogin (1985) reported that in the states of Georgia, Oregon, and Michigan, over sixty percent of all NGRI acquittals occurred when there had been negotiated plea dispositions that had occurred before trial. While this addresses NGRI acquittals as a result of negotiated plea dispositions, it does not address those cases in which information obtained for the insanity defense is used to derive some other benefit for the defendant. In a survey of attorneys and judges in New York, 25% of those responding reported that they believed that in serious cases the insanity plea was used to secure more favorable sentences (Burton & Steadman, 1978). Pasewark and Craig (1980) surveyed Wyoming attorneys who reported having entered the insanity plea on behalf of their clients but withdrew the plea when a negotiated disposition was more advantageous to their client.

Other survey studies have been concerned with related pleas. For example Klofas and Weisheit (1986) surveyed both prosecuting and defense attorneys in Illinois and examined the impact of the Guilty But Mentally Ill (GBMI) plea. Approximately 75% of the prosecuting attorneys and 61% of the defense attorneys agreed that the GBMI alternative was useful in negotiating dispositions, reportedly as an alternative to either pleading guilty or NGRI.

The survey research, as well as Monahan and Loftus (1982), suggest the defense could be used to assist the defendant at stages of the criminal justice process such as prior to preliminary hearing, prior to arraignment, and prior to trial. For instance as a negotiated disposition, there may be a straight plea to the crime charged in return for an agreement not to oppose deferred sentencing or probation. Also, there could be a plea to one of several charged crimes with the other crimes being dismissed. Because of the limitations of what is reported officially, the use of the insanity defense and its possible benefit can be obtained only through reports from attorneys. Such reporting, of course, is subject to volunteer bias, memory retrieval errors, interpretation errors as to what constitutes a “benefit” to the defendant, and duplication errors when surveying attorneys who may be reporting on the same case. The reporting also may be related to the attitudinal bias of the defense attorneys in comparison to prosecuting attorneys.

To estimate the use of the insanity defense, prosecuting and defense attorneys were queried about their experiences for various stages prior to trial and at trial. In particular they were asked if the issue of the insanity defense was raised and, if so, did it result in any “benefit to the defendant.” The phrase “benefit to the defendant” includes a successful NGRI plea per se, but also includes other outcomes beneficial to the defendant as determined by the reporting attorneys. Despite the ambiguity of the phrase “benefit to the defendant,” its subjective interpretation by criminal and prosecution attorneys affords an understanding of the use of the insanity defense at various stages in the criminal justice system. Lawyers’ attitudes toward the insanity defense from the perspective of criminal defense lawyers, prosecuting lawyer, and the general bar (remaining attorneys) were also surveyed. While these attitudes can not be directly tied to use of the insanity defense, they may lend insight in to possible systematic bias of the defense and prosecuting attorneys

Method

Subjects

Questionnaires were mailed to all 1,044 attorneys licensed in the State of Wyoming. Of these, 454 questionnaires were returned for a return rate of 43.49%. There were 66 defense attorneys and 39 prosecuting attorneys who indicated they had cases involved with the insanity defense during the preceding five years. There were four attorneys who classified themselves as being involved with the insanity defense as both criminal defense and as prosecuting attorneys. In all, there were 109 lawyers or 24.01% of the total respondents who were involved with criminal cases involving the insanity defense during the previous five years.

Materials and Procedure

The attorneys were sent a stamped, self-addressed envelope and a multiple page survey requesting information about themselves, their type of practice, their involvement in criminal defense cases, their involvement in insanity cases, and their views on issues related to the insanity defense. Questions were asked in order to determine basic demographics, attitudes towards various issues in the law, and, in the last five years, the frequency of involvement with criminal cases where the insanity defense was an issue.

Further questions were asked about the use of the insanity defense at different stages of the criminal justice system. For example, attorneys were asked: “At the preliminary hearing stage how many cases were you involved in that had as a defense the insanity defense?” Then they were asked: “How many of these were successful (resulted in some benefit to the defendant)?” The main thrust of the survey was to determine if lawyers who have been involved in cases where the insanity plea was used in some manner viewed its use as conferring some sort of benefit to the defendant throughout the various stages of the criminal justice system.

Additional questions were asked to confirm potential response biases of the different groups of attorneys. Questions were asked about the insanity defense including if they believed it was used too frequently and if jurors were capable of making decisions about the defense. The attorneys were asked their opinions about alternatives to the insanity defense, GBMI and Guilty And Mentally Ill (GAMI), and if those who receive this alternative verdict would receive less severe sentencing than those who receive guilty verdicts. Other questions were asked about the dangerousness of those individuals who were successful with the defense and the amount of time acquittees may spend confined relative to those who were convicted for similar crimes. The attorneys were asked if they were in favor of the initial evidentiary burden of proof on the defendant and if it would affect the use of the insanity defense by defendants.

Results

The responding attorneys were separated into three groups: those who were primarily defense attorneys, those who were primarily prosecuting attorneys, and, attorneys who had not been involved with the insanity defense in the last five years. The results section is divided into demographic data, the responses dealing with the use of the insanity defense, and the attitudinal items related to the insanity defense.

Demographic Data

The average age of all responding attorneys was 40.4 years. The average age was 37.9 years for defense attorneys, 37.0 for prosecuting attorneys, and 41.7 for general attorneys not involved in the insanity defense. For those responding to the gender item, 88.6% were males and 11.2% were females. For those identifying themselves as criminal defense lawyers 90.4% were males and 9.6% were females while for prosecuting attorneys 90.0% were males and 10.0% were females. For the general attorneys the ratio was 87.9% males and 11.8% females.

The average number of years practicing law by all attorneys was 12.3 years. The average years of practice for criminal defense lawyers was 9.3 years, for prosecuting attorneys 9.7 years, and for the general attorneys 13.6 years. The defense attorneys reported that an average of 33.7% of their time was devoted to criminal defense while the prosecuting attorneys reported that an average of 60.0% of their time was devoted to criminal prosecution. The average number of trials for defense lawyers was 50.5, while the averaging number of trials for prosecuting attorneys it was 69.3.

Insanity Defense

Insanity Defense: Criminal Justice Stages

Attorneys were asked if they had been involved actively in cases in which the insanity defense had been used in the last five years and, if so, if the defense had been successful (“of benefit to the defendant”).

Total number of insanity cases reported. The 66 defense attorneys reported a total of 346 cases in which the insanity defense was used in cases in which they were active. The 39 prosecuting attorneys reported a total of 422 cases in which the insanity defense was used in cases in which they were active.

Success of cases before preliminary hearing. There were 47 defense lawyers who reported 157 cases that used the insanity plea before the preliminary hearing. In response to the question of how many of these were successful, 38 defense lawyers reported 103 cases. There were 34 prosecuting attorneys who reported 135 cases that used the insanity plea before the preliminary hearing. Of these, 22 prosecuting attorneys reported 41 cases as successful.

Success of cases before district court arraignment. Thirty-one of the defense attorneys indicated that the insanity defense was used for 101 cases before the district court arraignment. Of these, 17 defense attorneys reported 47 cases were successful. Seventeen prosecuting attorneys indicated that it was used in 62 cases after the arraignment. Of these, seven prosecuting attorneys reported that 16 cases were successful.

Success of cases before trial. Thirty-three of the defense attorneys reported 145 cases used the insanity plea at this stage. Sixteen defense attorneys reported some benefit for 32 cases. Twenty-two prosecuting attorneys reported 196 cases used the plea at this stage. Ten prosecuting attorneys reported success in 24 cases.

Success of cases at trial. In the last stage surveyed, the trial, fifteen defense attorneys reported that in 22 cases they used the plea. Four defense attorneys reported that the insanity plea was successful in five cases. Eighteen prosecuting attorneys reported 41 cases in which the plea was used at trial. Of these, two prosecuting attorneys reported four cases as being successful.

Figure 1. Percent of cases reported as successful (benefit to the defendant) using the insanity defense at various stages of the criminal justice system.

Figure 1

Data for the four stages of the criminal justice system are summarized in Figures 1 and 2. (see Figures 1 and 2) Figure 1 shows the percentage of cases where the insanity defense was reported as successful at four stages of the criminal justice system. This represents the portion of attorneys reporting the use of the insanity defense as of benefit to the defendant. Figure 2 indicates the proportion of attorneys for each stage who reported a successful use of the insanity defense in the preceding five years.

Figure 2. Percent of attorneys reporting success (benefit to the defendant) using the insanity defense at various stages of the criminal justice system.

Figure 2

Insanity Defense: Plea Bargaining

The insanity defense can be used covertly or overtly. It can be a factor weighed implicitly by each side in reaching a negotiated disposition or it can be an expressed factor used explicitly in plea bargaining. The defense and prosecuting attorneys were asked how many times the insanity plea was used in plea bargaining. Forty-two defense attorneys and 23 prosecuting attorneys reported the plea was used for plea bargaining in 167 cases.

Figure 3. Reported success of the insanity plea for those cases in which plea bargaining occurred.

Figure 3

Thirty-three defense attorneys (78.6%) reported the plea as successful for plea bargaining in 124 cases. Fifteen prosecuting attorneys (65.2%) reported the plea as successful for plea bargaining in 33 cases. Of the cases reported, 59.6% were reported as successful by defense attorneys and 19.8% were reported as successful by prosecuting attorneys. These data are shown in Figure 3. (see Figure 3) In response to questions dealing with the insanity plea used during plea bargaining, both defense and prosecuting attorneys indicated it was successful. Defense attorneys reported proportionally more success then did prosecuting attorneys.

An overview of the data presented thus far shows that for each stage, both criminal defense attorneys and prosecuting attorneys reported some benefit to the defendant as a result of using the insanity defense. On a ratio basis, defense lawyers reported more benefit at each stage than did prosecuting attorneys. Furthermore, as the stages progressed, on a ratio basis, both defense and prosecuting attorneys reported less success with the defense.

Attitudinal Survey Results

Six of the eight attitudinal questions related to the insanity defense significantly differentiated the three groups of attorneys and are reported in Table 1. (see Table 1)

A number of states have passed legislation that allows for a verdict recognizing that some people who are guilty are also mentally ill. Two common verdicts are guilty, but mentally ill (GBMI) and guilty and mentally ill (GAMI). There were significant differences for the question approve of GBMI verdict and for whether the GBMI alternative would result in less severe sentencing than for those receiving guilty verdicts.

As part of the insanity plea reform, a number of jurisdictions, including Wyoming, have required that the defense bring forth evidence of insanity rather than continuing with the traditional burden on the prosecution to prove sanity initially after the insanity defense is invoked. There were significant differences between the three groups on whether this change would affect the use of the plea.

The common belief of the public appears to be that the insanity defense is used too frequently, that those successful acquittees spend less time confined, and are more dangerous than similar convictees. There were significant differences between the three groups on whether the plea is used too frequently, the length of confinement, and the dangerousness of NGRI acquittees as compared to similarly charged defendants who were found guilty.

In general, as might be expected from examining the earlier data on the use of the insanity plea, where defense lawyers reported its use more often and reported more often that its use in the preliminary stages of the criminal justice system had some benefit to defendants than did prosecuting attorneys, defense lawyers were more inclined to take a correspondingly positive perspective to questions regarding their attitudes about the plea. Similarly, prosecuting attorneys were more inclined to take a perspective corresponding to their relatively lower reports on the use of the insanity defense. In general, on a continuum, defense lawyers took one extreme and prosecuting attorneys took the other extreme with general lawyers falling somewhere between the other two groups. There were, however, some exceptions where the order was defense lawyers, prosecuting lawyers and then the general bar.

Discussion and Conclusion

The results of the survey suggest that the insanity defense has a varying degree of success that has not been clearly acknowledged when only considering the plea of insanity at trial. While “benefit to the defendant” is not necessarily the same as an acquittal resulting from a successful use of the insanity plea at trial, the perceptions of attorneys who have personal experience with the defense indicate that the insanity defense functions similarly to any other defense or to any information that tends to reduce the culpability of the defendant. The insanity defense has value at the various stages of the criminal justice system because it may be part of the information used in a negotiated deposition. If the results of the study can be generalized beyond the respondents of this study, then at every stage of the criminal justice system there is possible benefit to defendants who use the insanity plea as a strategy of defense.

In contrast, previous research has, essentially, addressed the success of the NGRI plea in terms of a comparison between the number of pleas entered and the number of NGRI acquittals. As an exception, Pasewark and Craig (1980), interviewed defense attorneys in Wyoming who had entered the plea. They found that of attorneys using the NGRI plea, 79% of the total reported that the purpose for which the plea had been originally entered was served. For those attorneys where the defense had met its purpose, they listed a wide variety of goals such as a determination of the viability of the plea (30.8%), negotiated dispositions or sentence reductions (20.5%) and background information provided to counsel and the court (12.8%). Similarly, in the present study, 59.6% of the defense attorneys reported cases as having a general “benefit to the defendant.”

It is obvious that the data obtained from the survey are not mutually exclusive and, as is inherent with any survey or analogue study, there is the problem of volunteer bias. The problems with the data, however, are probably no greater than exists for those data obtained from archives and estimates provided by administrative personnel such as State Forensic Directors. As is the case for these type of studies, the current study has a possible lack of external validly which is difficult to ascertain. Nonetheless, this survey should have substantially more external validity than the typical analogue studies using college students. The advantage of this study over archival studies is that the lawyers are responding to the same questions, as compared to an archival study in which the data are made to fit certain categories and the responses are often subject to interpretation. Assuming that the data are relatively valid and not distorted by volunteer bias, there is the question of their generalizeability to the legal process in Wyoming and to other states. There is no reason to believe that there is anything inherently different about the way attorneys in Wyoming negotiate dispositions from the way attorneys in other states use similar information to negotiate dispositions. In our opinion, after many years of use, we know less than we should know about how the insanity defense is used in the legal system (Blau, McGinley, & Pasewark, 1993).

Not unexpectedly, the attitudes expressed by the attorneys, in general, seem to reflect a bias consistent with the roles of the attorneys. For example the majority of the defense attorneys indicated they were not in favor of the defendant being held to the burden of proof of insanity and were not in favor of alternate pleas to the NGRI plea such as GBMI. For these issues, the majority of the prosecuting attorneys (and the general bar) responded in the opposite direction. Nearly three-quarters of both the prosecuting attorneys and the general bar responded that the GBMI alternative would result in less severe sentencing than would a guilty plea compared to slightly less than half of the defense attorneys. These differences in viewpoint are to be expected and are probably no different than differences of beliefs between many groups who interact with each other because of their employment or philosophical positions. If the data contain any surprises, it may be reflected in some of the agreement between the three groups of attorneys.

While one would expect most attorneys to say that jurors are capable of making correct NGRI decisions, it may be surprising that the attorneys expressed a general agreement (i.e., the majority of the attorneys expressed similar opinions) that the insanity plea is used about as frequently as it should be used and that defendants who are adjudicated NGRI are as dangerous or more dangerous than convictees. Also, no matter the legal role of the attorneys, the majority of the attorneys responded that NGRI acquittees will spend less time in confinement than will defendants found guilty of their crimes. Interestingly, in mock trial analogue studies, college students gave shorter confinement periods to individuals judged NGRI then those judged to be guilty for the same factual scenario (Blau, McGinley & Pasewark, 1992; Towers, McGinley, & Pasewark, 1992). One final point of general agreement is that if the burden of proof for the insanity plea is placed on defendants then there will be fewer insanity pleas.

In some instances, the literature is inconsistent with the attitudes and beliefs expressed by the attorneys surveyed. For example, while the surveyed attorneys generally agreed about the dangerousness of the NGRI acquittees, the literature on this issue is complex. This may be due in part to the difficulty of measuring violence (Mulvey & Lidz, 1993), the infrequency of certain types of crimes as repeated crimes (e.g., murder), and the length of “follow up” of a person after being released. In the current study, NGRI acquittees are viewed as dangerous or more dangerous than defendants who are convicted.

Pasewark, Pantle and Steadman (1979), examined length of confinement of NGRI acquittees and reported no significant difference in time spent in a hospital compared to time incarcerated for similarly convicted individuals. Later studies (Pasewark, Pantle & Steadman, 1982; Phillips & Pasewark, 1980), found that NGRI acquittees spent less time in the hospital than similarly convicted individuals spent confined. Nonetheless, the length of confinement is often quite variable and an individual NGRI acquittee may be confined significantly longer than a similarly situated convictee (Blau & Pasewark, 1994; Phillips & Pasewark, 1980; Seitz & Baridon, 1983). Rodriguez, LeWinn and Perlin (1983) report that NGRI acquittees spend twice as much time in incarceration as similarly situated convictees.

Two studies that have examined the impact of changing the burden of proof of the insanity defense from the prosecution to the defendant. In Hawaii, Pasewark, Parnell and Rock (1994) found no significant change in the frequency and success of the insanity defense when the burden of proof was transferred from the prosecution to the defendant. Similarly Ogloff (1991), in a simulated trial, found no significant verdict differences attributable to the change in the burden of proof. Ogloff also reported that mock jurors seemed unable to understand fundamental elements of the insanity defense such as burden of proof. The review by Blau and Pasewark (1994) examines this issue further.

Further work could employ better tracking methods, as suggested by Blau, McGinley, and Pasewark (1993). Also it would be desirable to follow a large number of cases where charges have been filed to see when, where, and to what degree the insanity defense is used. Nonetheless, the results of the current study document empirically that which may be implicit knowledge, especially in the legal community. The insanity defense is more often employed as a defense or as a defense strategy in the resolution of cases than is generally suggested, and lawyers’ attitudes toward the insanity and related defenses tend to be consistent with the roles the lawyers hold in the justice system.

References

Blau, G. L., McGinley, H., & Pasewark, R. A. (1992). Insanity defense: Jurors knowledge of disposition. Journal of Police and Criminal Psychology, 8 # 2, 2-5.

Blau, G. L., McGinley, H., & Pasewark, R. A. (1993). Understanding the use of the insanity defense. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 49, 435-440.

Blau, G. L., & Pasewark, R. A. (1994). Statutory changes and the insanity defense: Seeking the perfect insane person. Law and Psychology Review, 18, 69-108.

Burton, N. M., & Steadman, H. J. (1978). Legal professionals’ perceptions of the insanity defense. Journal of Psychiatry and Law, 6, 173-187.

Callahan, L. A., McGreevy, M. A., Cirincione, C., & Steadman, H. J. (1992). Measuring the effects of the Guilty but Mentally Ill (GBMI) verdict. Law and Human Behavior, 16, 447-462.

Callahan, L. A., & Steadman, H. J. (1990). Insanity defense reform in Ohio: Does the court of jurisdiction matter? Capital University Law Review, 19, 809-824

Klofas, J., & Weisheit, R. (1986). Pleading guilty but mentally ill: Adversarial justice and mental health. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 9, 491-501.

McGinley, H., & Pasewark, R. A. (1989). A national survey of frequency and success of the insanity and alternate pleas. Journal of Psychiatry and Law, 17, 205-222.

Monahan, J., & Loftus, E. F. (1982). The psychology of law. Annual Review of Psychology, 33, 441-475.

Mulvey, E. P., & Lidz, C. W. (1993). Measuring patient violence in dangerousness research. Law and Human Behavior, 17, 277-288

Ogloff, J. R. P (1991). A comparison of insanity defense standards on juror decision making. Law and Human Behavior, 15, 509-531.

Pasewark, R. A., & Craig, P. L. (1980). Insanity plea: Defense attorneys’ views. The Journal of Psychiatry and Law, 8, 413-441.

Pasewark, R. A., & McGinley, H. (1985). Insanity plea: National survey of frequency and success. Journal of Psychiatry and Law, 13, 101-118.

Pasewark, R. A., Pantle, M. L., & Steadman, H. J. (1979). The Insanity Plea in New York State, 1965-1976. New York State Bar Journal, 53, 186-189, 217-225.

Pasewark, R. A., Pantle, M. L., & Steadman, H. J. (1982). Detention and rearrest rates of person found not guilty by reason of insanity and convicted felons. American Journal of Psychiatry, 139, 892-897.

Pasewark, R. A., Parnell, B. A., & Rock, J. (1994). Insanity defense: Shifting the burden of proof. Journal of Police and Criminal Psychology, 10, 1-4.

Perlin, M. L. (1990). Unpacking the myths: The symbolism mythology of insanity defense jurisprudence. Case Western Law Review, 40, 599-731.

Perlin, M. L. (1994). The Jurisprudence of the insanity defense. Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press.

Phillips, B. L., & Pasewark, R. A. (1980). Insanity plea in Connecticut. Bulletin of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, 8, 155-164.

Rodriguez, J. H., LeWinn, L. M., & Perlin, M. L. (1983). The insanity defense under siege: Legislative assaults and legal rejoinders. Rutgers Law Journal, 14, 397-430.

Roesch, R., & Golding, S. L. (1978). Legal and judicial interpretation of competency to stand trial statutes and procedures. Criminology, 16, 420-429.

Seitz, F., & Baridon, P. (1983). Release of NGI patients from St. Elizabeths Hospital. American Journal of Forensic Psychology, 3, 108-119.

Silver, E., Carmen, C, & Steadman, H. J. (1994). Demythologizing inaccurate perceptions of the insanity defense, Law and Human Behavior, 18, 63-70.

Slobogin, C. (1985). The guilty but mentally ill verdict: An idea whose time should not have come. George Washington Law Review, 53, 494-527.

Towers, T., McGinley, H., & Pasewark, R. A. (1992). Insanity defense: Ethnicity of defendants and mock jurors. Journal of Psychiatry and Law, Summer, 243-256.

Table 1

Percent of Attorneys Responding to Attitudinal Questions

Attitude Item

Defense Attorney

General Bar

Prosecuting Attorney

Jurors capable of making NGRI decisions C² (2, N = 391) = 0.28, p = .869	Yes 77.1	No 22.9	Yes 75.4	No 24.6	Yes 73.1	No 26.9

Approve of GBMI verdict C² (2, N = 357) = 6.99, p = .030	58.0	42.0	66.4	33.2	80.0	20.0

GBMI alternative results in less severe sentencing then guilty alternative C² (2, N = 350) = 20.12, p < .001	48.7	51.3	76.1	23.5	72.3	27.7

Evidentiary change for the insanity defense C² (2, N = 388) = 37.52, p < .001	In favor 36.9	Against 63.1	In favor 69.2	Against 30.4	In favor 82.7	Against 17.3

Evidentiary change affect NGRI use C² (4, N = 350) = 5.77, p = .217	Increase 14.3	No change 31.2	Decrease 54.5	Increase 19.3	No change 24.7	Decrease 56.1	Increase 10.0	No change 20.0	Decrease 70.0

Frequency of use of the NGRI plea C² (4, N = 377) = 22.98, p < .001	Too frequent 13.3	As frequent 74.7	Too in- frequent 12.0	Too frequent 29.3	As frequent 68.2	Too in- frequent 2.5	Too frequent 32.7	As frequent 67.3	Too in- frequent 0.0

Confinement of NGRI acquittees compared to defendants found guilty C² (4, N = 319) = 11.46, p = .022	Greater 17.4	Equal 23.2	Shorter 59.4	Greater 15.0	Equal 12.1	Shorter 72.8	Greater 6.8	Equal 6.8	Shorter 86.4

Dangerousness of NGRI acquittees compared to defendants found guilty C² (4, N = 363) = 12.42, p = .014	25.6	62.8	11.5	37.0	56.6	6.4	42.0	58.0	0.0