

Toward a Comprehensive, Data-Driven Model of American Political Goals: Recognizing the “Values” and “Vices” Within Both Liberalism and Conservatism

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Benjamin M. Wilkowski¹ , Emilio Rivera¹,
Laverl Z. Williamson², Erika DiMariano¹, Brian P. Meier³, and
Adam Fetterman⁴

Abstract

When a person indicates they are “liberal” or “conservative,” an important part of what they are communicating is their *goals* for how they would like society to be structured. However, past theories have described these goals in dramatically different fashions, suggesting that either conservatism or liberalism reflects a divisive or unifying goal. To help overcome this impasse, we systematically compared a broad, representative sample of all possible higher-order goals (drawn a previous lexical investigation of more than 1,000 goals) to the political ideology of American adults (total $n = 1,588$). The results of five studies suggested that proposals from competing theories are all partially correct. Conservatism simultaneously reflects the unifying “value” of Tradition, as well as the divisive “vice” of Elitism; while Liberalism simultaneously reflects the unifying “value” of Inclusiveness, and the divisive “vice” of Rebellion. These results help to integrate proposals from previous competing theories into a single framework.

Keywords

political ideology, goals, values, prejudice, morality

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When a person indicates that they are “liberal” or “conservative,” an important part of what they are communicating is their *goals* for how they want society to be structured (see Introductory Section 1). Yet, past theories have described these goals in dramatically different fashions, proposing that either conservatism or liberalism reflects a “Divisive” goal (e.g., to keep historically disadvantaged groups in a disadvantaged position) or a “Unifying” goal (e.g., to bind individuals into a moral community) (see Introductory Section 2). This has led to debates and allegations of researcher bias (see Introductory Section 3). In an attempt to overcome this impasse, we sought to examine the nature of the goals reflected in the political ideology of American adults as objectively as possible (see Introductory Section 4). To do so, we took a *comprehensive* and *data-driven* approach, focusing on items selected to represent the major dimensions of goal-content found in a previous lexical investigation of more than 1,000 goals (see Introductory Section 5). We compared these goals with political ideology, voting behavior,

collective action intentions, constructs from past theories of political ideology, and different forms of prejudice.

To preview our results, we conclude that proposals from past, opposing theories are all partially correct. Conservatism simultaneously reflects the unifying “value” of Tradition and the divisive “vice” of Elitism. Similarly, Liberalism simultaneously reflects the unifying “value” of Inclusiveness and the divisive “vice” of Rebellion. Such results effectively integrate proposals from past, opposing theories into a common framework. Several aspects of this

¹University of Wyoming, Laramie, USA

²Western Wyoming Community College, Rock Springs, USA

³Gettysburg College, PA, USA

⁴University of Houston, TX, USA

Corresponding Author:

Benjamin M. Wilkowski, Department of Psychology, University of Wyoming, Laramie, 82070 WY, USA.

Email: bwilkows@uwyo.edu

framework are novel. For example, although Tradition is desirable to the average participant, it is simultaneously associated with concerning forms of prejudice (e.g., against lesbian women and gay men). Before describing prior research in more detail, it is important to first clarify the purpose of the current investigation.

Definitions and Purpose

The current investigation can best be understood as an attempt to comprehensively map the intersection between two partially overlapping constructs—namely *Political Ideology* and *High-Level Goals* (i.e., values, motives, vices). These constructs should be considered *overlapping* because Political Ideology is typically defined as a multicomponent construct containing a *person's goals for how they want society to be structured*, as well as other components (e.g., interpretations of current societal conditions, implications for behavior, identification with societal groups, the socially shared nature of these representations). For example, Erikson and Tedin (2003) defined political ideology as a “Set of beliefs about the *proper order of society* and how it can be achieved,” and Denzau and North (1994/2000) defined it as, “The shared framework of mental models that groups of individuals possess that provide both an interpretation of the environment and a *prescription as to how that environment should be structured*” (see Jost et al., 2009, for a review). Thus, goals cannot be considered a *cause* or *consequence* of political ideology, because they are *part* of ideology. Thus, the current investigation can be considered to be similar to other structural investigations that have mapped the intersection between overlapping constructs (e.g., affect/personality, Watson, 2000; psychopathology/personality, Kotov et al., 2017).

Following past precedents (Austin & Vancouver, 1996; Elliot, 2006; Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 1996), we define a *goal* as, “A current, conscious state of commitment to expend effort in order to affect one’s relationship with an end-state.” According to this definition, the construct of “goals” is an overarching umbrella term, encompassing many more specific types of goals (Austin & Vancouver, 1996). Goals exist at multiple levels of abstraction, ranging from low-level (e.g., to take a single step) to mid-level (e.g., to march in a Black Lives Matter protest) to high-level goals (e.g., to promote social justice). Past theories suggest that political ideology is most directly related to high level (i.e., superordinate & long-lasting) goals (e.g., Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2016; Piurko et al., 2011), and we follow that precedent here.

Some past research has focused solely on Values (e.g., Piurko et al., 2011), defined as high-level goals that the average person finds desirable (Schwartz, 1992). Please note that this definition of values only claims that they are “generally-desirable” to the average person, thus allowing for the possibility that a minority of people may find a value undesirable and be committed to avoiding it. Thus, we use the terms

“generally-desirable” and “values” in a purely descriptive sense, and these terms are not meant to be prescriptive. While values can potentially refer to any desirable, abstract state, research tends to find that political ideology is most strongly related to what we will call the “Unifying” Values—goals aimed at binding people into moral, cooperative, and/or mutually beneficial communities (Graham et al., 2018; Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013; Piurko et al., 2011).

However, other theories suggest that conservatism (e.g., Altemeyer, 2006; Pratto et al., 1994) or liberalism (e.g., Brandt et al., 2014; Conway et al., 2018) at least partially reflect goals aimed at generally-undesirable end-states, such as authoritarianism, dominance, or discrimination. A central purpose of the current investigation is to further examine this claim. We refer to such goals as “Vices,” defined as high-level goals that the average person finds undesirable and is committed to avoiding. Please note that vices tend to refer to states that many people across the political spectrum tend to find desirable at times (e.g., defiance, militarism), and which a significant minority of people report a commitment to approaching. Nonetheless, the average person is committed to avoiding these states. Thus, the terms “generally-undesirable” and “vice” are also used in a purely descriptive sense and not intended to be proscriptive. Furthermore, it is important to emphasize the “values” and “vices” differ only in valence and are otherwise similar constructs (i.e., both long-lasting, superordinate goals). While vices can refer to any undesirable, abstract state, past theory and research tends to link political ideology to what we will call the “Divisive” Vices—goals aimed at disadvantaging, excluding, or otherwise harming a group (Altemeyer, 2006; Conway et al., 2018).

Previous Perspectives on Political Ideology and Goal-Content

Past theories from political psychology have characterized conservative and liberal goals in dramatically different fashions. In this section, we review prior theories in the order which they historically appeared. We consider proposals suggesting that (a) conservatism reflects a Divisive vice, (b) conservatism reflects a Unifying value, (c) liberalism reflects a Unifying value, and (d) liberalism reflects a Divisive vice.

Conservatism Reflects a Divisive Vice

Early theories contended that conservatism reflects a goal to keep historically disadvantaged groups in their disadvantaged position. This work has largely focused on Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer, 1981) and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO; Pratto et al., 1994). Both RWA and SDO can be understood as multicomponent constructs that (like political ideology itself) contain goals and other components. RWA specifically reflects a goal to submit to leaders (*authoritarian submission*) who support the

preservation of societal conventions (*conventionalism*) and endorse the use of aggression against opposing groups (*authoritarian aggression*) (example item: “There are many radical, immoral people in our country today, who are trying to ruin it for their own godless purposes, whom the authorities should put out of action,” from Altemeyer, 2006). SDO reflects a goal to support group-based dominance hierarchies and oppose egalitarianism (example item: “An ideal society requires some groups to be on top and others to be on the bottom” from Ho et al., 2015). Consistent with the idea that they reflect a Divisive vice, they are both related to forms of prejudice that help to advance their core motivations. SDO is specifically related to Prejudice against Disadvantaged groups (e.g., Black & unemployed individuals), while RWA is related to Prejudice against Unconventional (e.g., protestors, feminists) and Dangerous groups (e.g., criminals) (e.g., Duckitt & Sibley, 2007).

Conservatism Reflects a Unifying Value

By contrast, Moral Foundations Theory (Graham et al., 2018) argues that conservatism is related to the “Binding Moral Foundations” for religious Purity, respect for Authority, and in-group Loyalty. These are considered “Binding” foundations because they are thought to bind individuals into moral communities. Loyalty directly encourages in-group cooperation, while Authority and Purity encourage it via fear of punishment from earthly and heavenly authorities (respectively), among other reasons. By contrast, this theory suggests that liberals rely only on the “Individualizing Moral Foundations” of Harm and Fairness, which protect individuals’ rights but fail to bind people into communities. These Foundations are conceptualized as psychological structures which produce intuitive (i.e., automatic, affect-laden) moral judgments. Importantly, this theory argues that moral intuitions are typically rationalized by later conscious thought, allowing them to influence conscious decision-making and behavior. Consistent with this, research from other theories shows that conscious motives and values containing highly overlapping content are related to conservatism. Tradition values (example item: “Devout [holding to religious faith & belief]” from Schwartz, 1992; cf. Piurko et al., 2011; Sandy et al., 2017), Conformity values (example item: “Obedient [dutiful, meeting obligations],” from Schwartz, 1992; cf. Piurko et al., 2011; Sandy et al., 2017), and Social Order motives (example item: “There are good reasons why traditional ways of living have lasted for so long, even if people don’t fully understand those reasons”; Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2016) are all related to conservatism.

Liberalism Reflects a Unifying Value

In contrast to Moral Foundations theory, the Model of Moral Motives (Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013) suggests that

liberals have their own, distinct set of unifying values. Specifically, liberalism has been related to Social Justice Motives, which binds individuals into moral communities by ensuring that resources are equitably distributed across all members of society (example item: “In the healthiest societies, those at the top should feel responsible for improving the well-being of those at the bottom”; Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2016). Other theories make similar assertions. For example, the Schwartz Values model suggests that Universalism values (example item: “Social Justice [correcting injustice, care for the weak]”) are linked to liberalism (Piurko et al., 2011; Sandy et al., 2017).

Liberalism Reflects a Divisive Vice

Finally, there has been a recent resurgence of interest in the construct of Left-Wing Authoritarianism (LWA; Conway et al., 2018). Like RWA, LWA is best considered a social-attitudinal construct that contains goals and other components. It specifically reflects a goal to submit to leaders who support liberal policies and endorse the use of aggression against opposing groups (example item: “Our country will be great if we honor the ways of progressive thinking, do what the best liberal authorities tell us to do, and get rid of the religious and conservative ‘rotten apples’ who are ruining everything”). Consistent with the idea that LWA reflects a divisive vice, it is related to Prejudice against Christians (Conway et al., 2018). This finding converges with a larger literature suggesting that liberalism is related to biases against predominantly conservative groups (e.g., the elderly & the military; Brandt et al., 2014).

Debates, Allegations of Bias, and the Role of Values in Scientific Research

Not surprisingly, these theorists have been critical of one another. For example, Kugler et al. (2014) argued that the Binding Foundations overlap considerably in content with RWA (cf. Sinn & Hayes, 2017). After all, both constructs emphasize obedience and adherence to traditional religiosity. Consistent with this, Kugler et al. found that RWA is strongly related to the Binding Foundations and mediates its relationship with Conservatism. Perhaps more importantly, the Binding Foundations were also related to greater prejudice against Muslims and immigrants—establishing a divisive consequence for these supposedly unifying moral intuitions. In a similar vein, Nilsson and Jost (2020) argue that authoritarianism is a uniquely right-wing phenomenon. They criticize Conway et al.’s (2018) LWA scale for using double- and triple-barreled items that leave participants who wish to endorse liberalism and oppose authoritarianism unsure how to respond. When these constructs are separated into different scales, content-neutral measures of authoritarian submission and aggression are associated with conservatism (Dunwoody & Funke, 2016).

By contrast, others argue that psychological research is dominated by liberals, creating bias against findings that portray conservatives favorably (Duarte et al., 2015; Inbar & Lammers, 2012). For example, Duarte et al. (2015) argued that liberal dominance within social psychology can lead researchers to mischaracterize the traits and abilities of conservatives. They offered research on RWA, SDO, and prejudice (Altemeyer, 2006; Duckitt, 2001) as a case in point, and offered research on liberals' biases against predominantly conservative groups (Brandt et al., 2014) as an example of the much-needed remedy (see Badaan & Jost, 2020, for a response; and Eitan et al., 2018 for further research).

Such debates have led Jost (2021) to reflect more deeply on the role values play in the scientific research process itself. Scientific researchers should clearly seek to produce accurate conclusions that are not biased by their beliefs. However, any field that is even remotely applied is inevitably guided by other values beyond objectivity. For example, Medical, Educational, and Clinical-Psychological researchers seek to produce knowledge that advances the socially valued goals of Physical Health, Learning, and Mental Health (respectively). These values are shared not only by researchers, but also by a substantial majority of society. In the same way, many Social-Psychologists seek to produce knowledge that can advance the socially valued goals of Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion. Jost (2021) argues that research on RWA, SDO, and the motivational basis of conservatism was meant to advance these goals, and researchers should not allow themselves to be distracted by idle debates about whether conservatives or liberals are "good" or "bad."

On these points, we agree with Jost (2021). However, we also add that if conclusions about conservative goals are biased (or even *perceived* as biased), then they will not effectively advance us toward a more equitable society. While we are by no means fully convinced by all of Duarte et al.'s (2015) critiques, many researchers clearly are convinced by many aspects of it (Ceci & Williams, 2015; Funder, 2015; Lilienfeld, 2015; Stanovich, 2021; Washburn et al., 2015). Beyond this, research should also advance other socially valued goals. Social-psychologists have long been interested in increasing cooperation between social groups (e.g., Sherif, 1958), and there is a clear, current need to unite conservative and liberal Americans into a more cohesive society (Abramowitz & Webster, 2018). The events of the last several years (e.g., distrust in election results; the January 6, 2021 Siege of the Capital) make the importance of this apparent. While a consensually accepted model of liberal and conservation goals could help to advance these aims, it is hard to see how a model that is biased (or even perceived as biased) could effectively do so.

The Utility of "Stimuli Diversity" for Reducing Bias

Yet how can unbiased evidence be produced? Like others (Jost, 2021; Kessler et al., 2015; Shweder, 2015) we are

skeptical of Duarte et al.'s assertion that greater "political diversity" (i.e., affirmative action for conservatives) is needed to solve this problem. Instead, we pursue Kessler et al.'s (2015) proposal that "Stimuli Diversity" can be used to overcome bias (cf. Brunswik, 1955; Westfall et al., 2015). Past research on goals and political ideology has focused on stimuli that reflect a narrow range of all possibly relevant higher-order goals—such as the items on the RWA (Altemeyer, 1981) and SDO (Ho et al., 2015) scales. The selection and composition of these items could *potentially* be biased by researchers' own beliefs, and this could *potentially* lead to inaccurate characterizations of conservatives' goals and prejudices. Examining a broader sample of goal-descriptive items would reduce the likelihood of bias. Ideally, this should include a representative sampling of all positively and negatively valenced language used to describe both liberal and conservative goals within a holistic map of goal-content.

The Lexical Approach of Personality researchers (John et al., 2008) provides a useful example. Building on the assumption that the most important traits will come to be represented in language as single words, lexical researchers began by extracting all personality-descriptive adjectives from dictionaries. They then asked large samples to rate how well each adjective described themselves and performed factor analyses on the ratings. The result is the widely accepted "Big Five" taxonomy. It allowed researchers to construct relatively brief instruments that representatively sample items reflecting all major dimensions. We argue that taking a similar approach to the study of goal-content will yield a representative sample of goals.

Obtaining a Representative Sample of Goals

Psychometric research suggests that political ideology is deeply engrained in the structure of values and higher-order goals. In the Schwartz (2012) Values Model, for example, values are organized along two orthogonal dimensions. One dimension contrasts the *Conservation* values (tradition, conformity, security) with the *Openness-to-Change* values (self-direction, stimulation). Orthogonal to this lies a dimension that contrasts *Self-Enhancement* values (power, achievement) with the *Self-Transcendence* values (universalism, benevolence). Empirical research indicates that Universalism is most strongly related to liberalism, followed by Openness-to-Change (Piurko et al., 2011; Sandy et al., 2017). By contrast, Conservation is most strongly related to political conservatism, followed by Self-Enhancement (Piurko et al., 2011; Sandy et al., 2017; cf. Saucier, 2000). Because this body of research focuses only on *values*, however, it is incapable of understanding the role of *vices*.

Only recently has research begun to chart the more holistic structure of high-level goals—including values and vices.

Table 1. Summary of Hypothesized Correlates of Goals from the PINT-Taxonomy.

Goal	Political ideology and voting	Constructs from past theories	Collective action	Dimension of generalized prejudice
Elitism	Conservative	SDO	—	Against Disadvantaged Groups
Tradition	Conservative	RWA (Conventionalism), Binding MF, Social Order MM	—	Against Unconventional & Dangerous Groups
Inclusiveness	Liberal	Social Justice, Helping & Not-Harming MM, Individualizing MF	Normative Activism	(Not positively related to any form of prejudice)
Rebellion	Liberal	LWA	Non-Normative Radicalism	Against Conservative Groups

Note. SDO = Social Dominance Orientation; RWA = Right-Wing Authoritarianism; MF = Moral Foundations; MM = Moral Motives; LWA = Left-Wing Authoritarianism.

Wilkowski et al. (2020, 2022) charted the structure of both generally desirable and generally-undesirable higher-order goals found in the American English lexicon (cf. de Raad et al., 2016; Saucier, 2000 for other lexical studies). To do so, they first located more than 1,000 goal-descriptive nouns. They then asked several large and diverse samples to rate their commitment to approaching or avoiding them. Multidimensional scaling analyses clearly replicated Schwartz's dimensions of Conservation versus Openness-to-Change and Self-Enhancement versus Self-Transcendence. Importantly, though, it added a third dimension—General Desirability versus Undesirability—to model the difference between values and vices (Wilkowski et al., 2022).

Within the generally desirable region of this model, two highly replicable components appear to describe the core values of liberalism and conservatism (Wilkowski et al., 2020, 2022). *Inclusiveness* appears to describe a goal to establish positive relationships with people of all types—including outgroup members (example items: *diversity, equity, solidarity*). It appears to overlap in content with constructs such as Universalism (Pioro et al., 2011) and Social Justice motives (Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2016), which past research relates to liberalism. By contrast, *Tradition* appears to describe a goal to take part in the long-standing institutions of the ingroup (example items: *blessedness, patriotism, obedience*). It appears to overlap in content with constructs such as the Binding Foundations (Graham et al., 2018), Social Order Motives (Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2016), and Tradition values (within the Schwartz values; Pioro et al., 2011), which past research links to conservatism. A third highly replicable value, *Prominence*, is less obviously relevant to political ideology.

Within the generally-undesirable region of this model, two highly replicable constructs appear to represent the vices of conservatism and liberalism (Wilkowski et al., 2022). *Elitism* represents the “opposite” of *Inclusiveness*. It appears to reflect a goal to elevate oneself and one's group to a dominant position, even without the voluntary consent of others (example items: *coercion, authoritarianism, militarism*).

Given this, it is reasonable to hypothesize that a commitment to approach *Elitism* is related to conservatism. *Rebellion* represents the “opposite” of *Tradition*. It appears to describe a goal to defy the institutions of the dominant social group (example items: *protest, atheism, defiance*). Given this, it is reasonable to hypothesize that a commitment to approach *Rebellion* is related to liberalism. A third replicable vice, *Disrepute*, is less obviously relevant to political ideology.

Testing a Comprehensive Model in the Current Investigation

We conducted five studies to examine how the above-described goals (Wilkowski et al., 2020, 2022) are related to political ideology, voting behavior, collective action intentions, constructs from the theories reviewed above, and dimensions of generalized prejudice. Because these goal-constructs were empirically derived from a larger pool of more than 1,000 goal-descriptive nouns, they provide a more comprehensive and data-driven understanding of the goals underlying political ideology. Beyond this, it also helps to better characterize the potentially unifying versus divisive consequences of each goal. Democracy is built around a rejection of violence to solve disputes and respect for the legitimacy of the opposition (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2019; McCoy & Somer, 2019). As such, violent collective action (or “radicalism”), authoritarian aggression, and prejudice (even against the opposition party) can be considered “divisive” consequences.

We used these studies to test the following integrated account of political goals (see Table 1 for a summary of hypotheses): First, liberalism should partially reflect the generally desirable and unifying value of *Inclusiveness*. If so, *Inclusiveness* should be rated as desirable by the average person. More importantly, a stronger commitment to approach *Inclusiveness* should be related to greater endorsement of a liberal ideology and likelihood of voting for liberal candidates. Conversely, commitments to avoid *Inclusiveness* should be related to conservatism. It should also

conceptually overlap with and thus should be strongly related to Social Justice, Helping, and Not-Harming motives (Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2016), as well as the “Individualizing” Foundations (Graham et al., 2018). Because it emphasizes inclusion of all groups, we hypothesize that it will not be related to any form of prejudice—even against conservatives. Finally, it should be related to nonviolent forms of collective action (i.e., activism).

Nonetheless, we propose that liberalism also partially reflects the generally-undesirable and divisive vice of Rebellion. If so, the average person should rate Rebellion as undesirable and be committed to avoiding it. Nonetheless, a commitment to approaching it should be related to stronger endorsement of liberal ideology and likelihood of voting for liberal candidates. Conversely, stronger commitments to avoiding it should be related to conservatism. It should conceptually overlap with LWA to some degree and thus be correlated with it. Because it is a divisive vice, it should also be related to anti-Conservative prejudice and the willingness to engage in violent collective action (i.e., radicalism).

Conservatism is proposed to partially reflect the generally-undesirable and divisive vice of Elitism. If so, the average person should rate Elitism as undesirable. More importantly, a commitment to approaching it should be related to stronger endorsement of a conservative ideology and likelihood of voting for conservative candidates. Conversely, a stronger commitment to avoiding Elitism should be related to liberalism. Beyond this, Elitism should conceptually overlap with and thus be strongly related to SDO. Because it is conceptualized as a divisive vice, it should be associated with forms of prejudice that have been linked to SDO (Duckitt & Sibley, 2007), namely Prejudice against Disadvantaged Groups (e.g., Black and Hispanic Americans). It should also be related to Authoritarian Aggression.

Finally, Tradition is conceptualized as the most complex of all political goals. It is conceptualized as a value, and thus the average participant should find it desirable. Moreover, a stronger commitment to approaching it should be related to a greater endorsement of a conservative ideology and likelihood of voting for conservative candidates. Conversely, commitments to avoiding it should be related to liberalism. Nonetheless, it is a highly parochial goal that is focused on uniting the ingroup, but also a willingness to disadvantage the outgroup to reach that aim. It should therefore overlap with and thus be strongly related to the Binding Foundations (Graham et al., 2018) and Social Order motives (Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2016). At the same time, it should also overlap with and thus be strongly related to RWA, especially its Conventionalism facet (Dunwoody & Funke, 2016). Thus, despite being generally desirable, Tradition should be related to such divisive behaviors as Authoritarian Submission and Aggression; and Prejudice against Unconventional groups (e.g., gay men, lesbian women, feminists), and Dangerous groups (e.g., terrorists) which challenge the conventional order.

Studies 1 to 5

Method

All studies used similar measures and procedures. When possible, we report our results meta-analytically (Cumming, 2014). Because of this, we report all studies together.

Open Science Practices and Sample Size Determination. In all studies, we report all measures relevant to hypotheses, how we determined our sample size, and data exclusions. Verbatim Method files, Data, and Analytic Code are available at <https://osf.io/3xrv5/>. Each study contained measures to test additional hypotheses unrelated to current concerns. We disclose all such measures fully in the verbatim methods files, but we do not report them in detail here. In each study, we sought to recruit a final sample of 250 participants (or greater), as this is the sample size at which correlations stabilize (Schönbrodt & Perugini, 2013). All studies received IRB approval. Studies were not preregistered.

Participants for Studies 3 to 5 were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (mTurk). To be eligible, mTurk workers were required to be living in the United States, have a HIT approval rate of 95% or higher, and have passed CloudResearch’s pre-screening procedure. Because mTurk workers sometimes provide low-quality data, we took several recommended precautions to protect against this (Buhrmester et al., 2018; Litman & Robinson, 2020). We excluded participants who failed two or more attention checks, endorsed two or more low-frequency responses (e.g., “Are you in a gang?”), provided a nonsensical response to an open-ended question, or directly indicated they provided low-quality data. We disclose that another sample was collected with identical measures to Studies 4 to 5, but without these precautions in place. The resulting dataset was highly problematic, as reported in Rivera et al. (2022), and is not reported here. This motivated the adoption of the precautions used in Studies 3 to 5.

Participants. Demographic information for all studies is summarized in Table 2.

Study 1. A total of 459 undergraduate students from the University of Wyoming completed the focal measures as part of a department-wide, online prescreening survey for course credit.

Study 2. A total of 261 users of Prolific Academic (Peer et al., 2017) living in the United States completed this study for a small payment. This study was previously presented as Wilkowski et al. (2022, Study 4), but the analyses reported here are novel.

Study 3. Data for this study were collected on mTurk in the week before the 2020 American Election (*Time 1*) and the days after the Presidential election was called (by the

Table 2. Summary of Demographic Information for All Studies.

Study	Source	<i>n</i>	% Female	% Male	Mean age (range)	% White	% Hispanic	% Black	% Asian
Study 1	Student	459	71.5	28.5	19.9 (17–49)	82.4	9.4	1.3	2.8
Study 2	Prolific	261	59.0	41.0	33.9 (18–75)	69.7	8.0	9.2	8.8
Study 3 (T1)	mTurk	331	48.3	51.1	41.6 (19–83)	75.2	5.7	12.7	9.4
Study 3 (T2)	mTurk	299	47.5	52.2	42.3 (19–83)	76.3	6.7	11.7	10.7
Study 4	mTurk	259	54.1	45.2	40.9 (18–82)	72.6	5.0	9.3	10.8
Study 5	mTurk	278	57.2	42.4	42.9 (21–80)	74.1	5.0	8.6	7.9

Note. Groups that routinely represented <1% are not listed. T1 = Time 1. T2 = Time 2.

Table 3. Means (and SDs) of Focal Measures Administered in All Studies.

Study	Tradition	Inclusiveness	Prominence	Elitism	Rebellion	Disrepute	Conservatism (vs. Liberalism)
1	1.01 (1.05)	1.34 (0.79)	0.95 (0.74)	-0.88 (1.00)	-0.35 (0.93)	-1.42 (1.07)	4.00 (1.61)
2	0.44 (1.16)	1.25 (0.89)	0.49 (0.80)	-1.61 (1.00)	-0.39 (1.04)	-1.86 (1.01)	3.08 (1.54)
3 (T1)	0.83 (1.28)	1.46 (0.97)	0.65 (0.89)	-1.64 (1.10)	-0.66 (1.19)	-2.21 (1.07)	3.34 (1.78)
3 (T2)	0.96 (1.24)	1.53 (0.96)	0.67 (0.85)	-1.60 (1.10)	-0.76 (1.18)	-2.28 (1.11)	3.33 (1.80)
4	1.14 (1.26)	1.27 (1.11)	0.62 (1.09)	-1.45 (1.36)	-0.78 (1.32)	-2.10 (1.37)	3.67 (1.89)
5	0.96 (1.27)	1.39 (1.04)	0.56 (0.89)	-1.69 (1.12)	-0.92 (1.15)	-2.22 (1.15)	3.47 (1.81)

Note. For goal-commitment scales, positive means indicate a commitment to approaching, while negative means indicate a commitment to avoiding. Political conservatism (vs. liberalism) was measured on a 1 (*extremely liberal*) to 7 (*extremely conservative*) response scale.

Associated Press; *Time 2*). To be eligible, participants had to be a registered voter. Three hundred thirty-one participants provided usable Time 1 data. Of these, 299 participants provided usable Time 2 data. Of these, 258 voted.

Study 4. In total of 258 mTurk users provided usable data. This study was previously presented as Rivera et al. (2022, Sample 2), but the analyses reported here are novel.

Study 5. In total of 278 mTurk users provided usable data. This study was previously presented as Rivera et al. (2022, Sample 3), but the analyses reported here are novel.

Procedures and Measures

All data collection took place online using SONA (for Study 1) or Qualtrics (for Studies 2–5) software. Readers interested in a more detailed presentation are directed to Supplemental Section 1.

The PINT Goal-Contents Scale. Participants in all studies were asked to rate their commitment (+4—*Extremely Strong Committed to Avoiding* to 4—*Extremely Strong Commitment to*) to 42 items representing Inclusiveness (e.g., *diversity, empathy, interconnectedness*), Tradition (e.g., *blessedness, marriage, patriotism*), and Prominence (e.g., *perfection, popularity, moneymaking*) goals (Wilkowski et al., 2020). Higher (more positive) scores thus indicated a commitment to approach, while lower (more negative) scores indicated a

commitment to avoid. Consistent with their conceptualization as generally desirable values, the average person was committed to approaching them in all studies (see Table 3). These scales were initially derived from an item pool of more than 1,000 goal-relevant nouns. They can be distinguished in principal component and multidimensional scaling (MDS) analyses are reliable and valid. In the current studies, they exhibited acceptable (or better) levels of inter-item consistency (all $\omega_s \geq .70$) and test-retest stability (all test-retest $r_s > .80$ in Study 3) (see Supplemental Table 1). To remove conceptual overlap with outcomes, we removed the Tradition item “conservatism” from analyses involving ideology.

The Undesirable END of Goal-Contents Scale. Participants in all studies also rated their commitment to 30 items representing Elitism (e.g., *coercion, vanity, authoritarianism*), Rebellion (e.g., *defiance, protest, wildness*), and Disrepute (e.g., *isolation, delinquency, depression*), using the same scale as above (Wilkowski et al., 2022). Higher (more positive) scores once again indicated a commitment to approach, while lower (more negative) scores indicated a commitment to avoid. Consistent with their conceptualization as generally-undesirable vices, the average participant reported a commitment to avoiding these in all studies (see Table 3). They are reliable and valid and can be distinguished as separate constructs in MDS analyses. In the current studies, they exhibited acceptable (or better) levels of inter-item consistency (all $\omega_s \geq .70$) and test-retest stability (all test-retest $r_s > .66$ in Study 3) (see Supplemental Table 1).

Political Ideology. Participants in all studies were asked to indicate their political ideology using a 1 (*extremely liberal*) to 7 (*extremely conservative*) scale. Study 3 participants were also asked to indicate their political party identification using a 1 (*strongly identify as a Democrat*) to 7 (*strongly identify as a Republican*) response scale. These items were strongly correlated at Time 1 ($r = .87$) and Time 2 ($r = .88$) and were averaged.

Voting Behavior. At Time 2, Study 3 participants were asked to indicate who they voted for in the Presidential, U.S. Senate, and U.S. House Elections.

Activism and Radicalism. At both timepoints, Study 3 participants indicated their willingness to engage in Activism (i.e., normative collective actions, such as peaceful protest and petition-signing) and Radicalism (i.e., non-normative collective actions, such as violent protest) (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009).

Social Dominance Orientation. Studies 4 and 5 participants were asked to indicate how much they agreed with statements supporting group-based dominance and inequality (Ho et al., 2015). SDO is a social-attitudinal construct containing both goals and other components (Duckitt, 2001). It is consistently associated with conservatism (Wilson & Sibley, 2013) and prejudice against a variety of outgroups (e.g., “derogated” outgroups; Duckitt & Sibley, 2007).

Right-Wing Authoritarianism. Studies 4 and 5 participants were also asked to indicate how strongly they agreed with items describing submission to authority figures who advocate conventional views and violence against opposing groups (Altemeyer, 2006). Like SDO, RWA is a multicomponent social-attitudinal construct containing goals. It is consistently associated with conservatism (Wilson & Sibley, 2013) and some forms of prejudice (e.g., against “dissident” and “dangerous” groups; Duckitt & Sibley, 2007). Nonetheless, this measure has been criticized for its use of multibarreled questions (Dunwoody & Funke, 2016; Nilsson & Jost, 2020). Despite this, it continues to be the most widely used measure of RWA (see Conway et al., 2018, for clear documentation of this), and we included it for this reason.

Left-Wing Authoritarianism. Studies 4 and 5 participants were asked to indicate how strongly they agree with items indicative of the tendency to submit to authority figures who advocate for liberal policies and violence against conservative groups. This scale is related to liberalism and anti-Christian prejudice. It has been criticized on the same grounds as the RWA scale (Nilsson & Jost, 2020). At the time of Studies 4 and 5, however, no better-validated measure existed that purported to capture left-leaning authoritarianism, and we

included it for that reason (however, see Costello et al., 2022, for a more recent measure).

Aggression-Submission-Conventionalism. This scale seeks to correct many issues noted with Altemeyer’s RWA scale and was included in Studies 4 and 5 for this reason (Dunwoody & Funke, 2016). It uses single-barreled items to separately ask participants about their endorsement of Authoritarian Aggression, Authoritarian Submission, and Conventionalism. All three factors are related to conservatism.

Moral Foundation Sacredness Scale. Participants of Studies 4 and 5 were asked to indicate how much they would need to be paid to perform actions that violate the Binding (i.e., Loyalty, Authority, Purity) and Individualizing (i.e., Harm, Fairness) Foundations (Graham & Haidt, 2012). The Binding Foundations are associated with conservatism, while the Individualizing Foundations are modestly associated with liberalism.

Measure of Moral Motives. Participants of Studies 4 and 5 were asked to indicate how much they agree with items describing six different moral motives: Social-Justice, Social-Order, Not-Harming, Helping/Fairness, Self-Restraint, and Industriousness (Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2016). Social-Justice and Social-Order have been linked to liberalism and conservatism (respectively).

Dimensions of Generalized Prejudice. While prejudices against different groups often co-occur, prejudices against different “types” of groups can, nonetheless, be distinguished (Bergh & Brandt, 2021; Duckitt & Sibley, 2007). To measure these, we adopted items from previous investigations that appeared relevant to the American cultural context of 2020. Participants in Studies 4 and 5 were asked to indicate their feelings toward each group using 100-point feeling thermometers. We found four factors (see Supplementary Section 1): Prejudice against Disadvantaged groups (*women, poor people*), Conservative/Privileged groups (*Republicans, rich people*), Dangerous groups (*violent criminals, terrorists*), and Unconventional groups (*feminists, Lesbian women, Gay men*).

Analytic Strategy. We hypothesized that four goals would all exhibit *unique* relationships with Political Ideology. To test this, we conducted both correlational and multiple regression analyses. In multiple regressions, six goals were simultaneously entered as predictors. Hypotheses for the dichotomous outcome of Voting were parallel and tested with logistic regression.

For Constructs from Past Theories (RWA, LWA, etc.) and Dimensions of Generalized Prejudice, hypotheses instead specified the goal that should be *most strongly related* to each construct. This subtle shift necessitated a different analytic strategy. We focused only on zero-order correlations

Table 4. Relationships Between Goal-Commitments and Political Conservatism (vs. Liberalism).

Study	Inclusiveness		Tradition		Prominence	
	<i>r</i>	β	<i>r</i>	β	<i>r</i>	β
Study 1	-.32 [-.40, -.24]	-.42 [-.50, -.33]	.49 [.42, .56]	.42 [.33, .51]	.22 [.13, .31]	.13 [.04, .22]
Study 2	-.42 [-.51, -.31]	-.27 [-.38, -.15]	.47 [.37, .56]	.25 [.13, .37]	.08 [-.04, .20]	-.03 [-.15, .08]
Study 3 (T1)	-.31 [-.40, -.20]	-.28 [-.39, -.16]	.44 [.35, .52]	.34 [.22, .46]	<i>.10</i> [-.01, .21]	-.04 [-.14, .06]
Study 3 (T2)	-.36 [-.45, -.25]	-.47 [-.59, -.34]	.41 [.31, .50]	.36 [.23, .49]	.06 [-.05, .18]	.01 [-.10, .11]
Study 4	-.34 [-.44, -.23]	-.38 [-.49, -.26]	.42 [.31, .51]	.31 [.17, .45]	.24 [.12, .35]	.17 [.03, .30]
Study 5	-.31 [-.42, -.20]	-.41 [-.53, -.28]	.34 [.24, .44]	.33 [.20, .47]	-.01 [-.13, .11]	-.04 [-.16, .08]
Mini-Meta	-.34 [-.38, -.29]	—	.44 [.40, .48]	—	.14 [.09, .19]	—
Mega	-.33 [-.37, -.28]	-.33 [-.38, -.28]	.42 [.38, .47]	.34 [.28, .39]	.13 [.09, .18]	<i>.04</i> [-.01, .09]

Study	Rebellion		Elitism		Disrepute	
	<i>r</i>	β	<i>r</i>	β	<i>r</i>	β
Study 1	-.39 [-.46, -.31]	-.18 [-.27, -.09]	.27 [.18, .35]	.03 [-.07, .13]	-.07 [-.16, .03]	-.05 [-.15, .05]
Study 2	-.48 [-.57, -.38]	-.25 [-.38, -.12]	.25 [.14, .36]	.19 [.04, .34]	<i>-.12</i> [-.24, .001]	<i>-.13</i> [-.27, .02]
Study 3 (T1)	-.39 [-.48, -.30]	<i>-.12</i> [-.25, .01]	.27 [.17, .37]	.18 [.04, .31]	<i>-.09</i> [-.20, .01]	-.14 [-.27, -.01]
Study 3 (T2)	-.39 [-.48, -.28]	-.11 [-.25, .03]	.20 [.09, .31]	-.04 [-.18, .10]	-.08 [-.19, .03]	-.09 [-.23, .05]
Study 4	-.30 [-.40, -.18]	-.22 [-.38, -.05]	.24 [.12, .35]	<i>.16</i> [-.01, .33]	.02 [-.11, .14]	.01 [-.15, .18]
Study 5	-.38 [-.47, -.27]	<i>-.14</i> [-.29, .01]	.08 [-.04, .20]	.03 [-.13, .19]	<i>-.11</i> [-.23, .00]	-.12 [-.28, .04]
Mini-Meta	-.39 [-.43, -.34]	—	.23 [.18, .28]	—	-.08 [-.13, -.03]	—
Mega	-.37 [-.42, -.33]	-.17 [-.22, -.11]	.22 [.17, .27]	.12 [.06, .18]	-.07 [-.12, -.02]	-.07 [-.13, -.01]

Note. *r*s indicate zero-order relationships; β s indicate unique relationships, controlling for other goals; Positive values indicate a relationship with Conservatism, while Negative values indicate a relationship with Liberalism. Values in brackets are 95% CIs. Bold font indicates $p < .05$. Italic font indicates $p < .10$. A mini-meta-analysis was not conducted on regression coefficients because this is not recommended with less than 10 studies. Only T1 from Study 3 was entered into summary analyses. CI = confidence interval.

and used procedures developed by Meng et al. (1992) to test whether the hypothesized goal more strongly correlated with the target construct than other goals.

We report effect sizes (*r*s, standardized regression coefficients, odds ratios) and 95% confidence intervals for all analyses. Whenever possible, we use “mini-meta-analyses” (Goh et al., 2016) to summarize correlations across studies. Because mini-meta-analyses are not recommended for multiple regression with less than 10 studies (Goh et al., 2016), we instead used a “mega-analysis” strategy (e.g., Fleeson & Gallagher, 2009). To do so, we estimated a multilevel model on a combined dataset, with participants nested within study. We focus mainly on these fixed-effects-only models. See Supplemental Section 1 for more information on the analytic strategy.

Results

Political Ideology (All Studies). Table 4 summarizes relationship between Goal-Commitments and Political Ideology. Supporting our first hypotheses, analyses indicated that commitments to approach Tradition and Elitism were associated with greater Conservatism, while commitments to approach Inclusiveness and Rebellion were associated with greater Liberalism. For Inclusiveness and Tradition, these relationships were robust and replicated across all studies and analyses. For

Rebellion and Elitism, hypothesized effects were typically apparent at the zero-order level, but their unique relationships only became clearly apparent in mega-analyses. Supplemental Section 2 discusses hypothesis-irrelevant effects. Supplemental Section 3 shows that the effects of Tradition and Inclusiveness can be replicated with overlapping constructs from past theories, but that Rebellion and Elitism still exhibit significant, unique effects beyond them.

Voting Behavior (Study 3). Table 5 summarizes the results of logistic regressions examining prospective relationship between T1 Goal-Commitments and T2 Voting Behavior. (Cross-sectional analyses largely replicate these effects; see Supplementary Section 4). Supporting hypotheses, Tradition and Inclusiveness were consistently associated with Conservative and Liberal Voting (respectively). In contrast to hypotheses, however, Rebellion and Elitism were only significantly related to Voting at the zero-order level. Once overlap with Tradition and Inclusiveness was controlled for, these relationships were no longer significant. See Supplemental Section 5 for discussion of additional, unsupported hypothesis.

Collective Action (Study 3). Our main analyses sought to determine which goals are related to a consistent willingness to

Table 5. Prospective Relationship Between T1 Goal-Commitments and T2 Conservative (vs. Liberal) Voting Behavior in Study 3.

	President		Senate		House	
	OR	OR'	OR	OR'	OR	OR'
Elitism	1.70 [1.28, 2.29]	<i>1.64</i> [0.97, 2.84]	1.59 [1.19, 2.17]	1.54 [0.89, 2.73]	1.59 [1.21, 2.10]	1.44 [0.87, 2.42]
Tradition	3.72 [2.55, 5.67]	4.94 [2.78, 9.35]	4.06 [2.68, 6.48]	6.11 [3.22, 12.58]	4.03 [2.76, 6.17]	5.73 [3.23, 10.82]
Inclusiveness	.46 [0.33, 0.62]	.32 [0.20, 0.50]	.52 [0.37, 0.70]	.31 [0.18, 0.50]	.50 [0.37, 0.67]	.30 [0.18, 0.47]
Rebellion	.47 [0.34, 0.62]	1.17 [0.69, 2.00]	.46 [0.33, 0.63]	1.16 [0.67, 2.03]	.46 [0.34, 0.61]	1.23 [0.75, 2.04]
Prominence	1.16 [0.89, 1.50]	.85 [0.58, 1.25]	1.11 [0.85, 1.47]	.85 [0.56, 1.27]	1.18 [0.91, 1.52]	.99 [0.63, 1.55]
Disrepute	.78 [0.58, 1.04]	.49 [0.28, 0.83]	.79 [0.58, 1.06]	.52 [0.29, 0.90]	.75 [0.56, 0.99]	.88 [0.28, 0.82]

Note. OR indicates odds ratios for zero-order relationships; OR' indicates Odds Ratios for unique relationships, controlling for other goals. ORs > 1 indicate a relationship with Conservative voting; ORs < 1 indicate a relationship with Liberal voting. Values in brackets are 95% CIs. Bold font indicates $p < .05$. Italic font indicates $p < .10$. CI = confidence interval.

Table 6. Relationship Between T1 Goal-Commitments and T2 Collective Action Intentions in Study 3.

	Activism		Radicalism	
	<i>r</i>	β	<i>r</i>	β
Inclusiveness	.29 [.18, .39]	.24 [.10, .38]	.09 [-.03, .20]	.06 [-.08, .20]
Rebellion	.05 [-.07, .17]	.14 [-.02, .30]	.22 [.11, .33]	.17 [.01, .33]
Tradition	.03 [-.09, .14]	.05 [-.11, .21]	-.19 [-.30, -.07]	-.09 [-.25, .07]
Elitism	-.14 [-.25, -.02]	-.01 [-.18, .16]	-.07 [-.19, .04]	-.08 [-.26, .09]
Prominence	.13 [.02, .25]	.09 [-.03, .22]	.03 [-.08, .15]	.08 [-.05, .21]
Disrepute	-.15 [-.26, -.04]	-.08 [-.25, .08]	.05 [-.06, .17]	.02 [-.15, .20]

Note. Multiple regression analyses reported here controlled for other T1 goal-commitments, but not for T1 Collective Action Intentions. Bold font indicates $p < .05$. See Table 4 for further explanatory notes.

engage in collective action (rather than examining change over time). Whether these analyses focused on the prospective relationship between T1 Goal-Commitments and T2 Collective Action (see Table 6) or on cross-sectional relationships at one time point (see Supplemental Section 4), the results were similar: Consistent with hypotheses, Inclusiveness was consistently related to Activism (i.e., Normative collective action); while Rebellion was consistently related to Radicalism (i.e., Non-Normative collective action). Future research should further examine this by examining forms of collective action aimed at different causes (see Osborne et al., 2019).

When we conducted multiple regression analyses that examined change in collective action intentions over time (i.e., predicting T2 intentions, after controlling for T1 intentions), a different, non-hypothesized result emerged. T1 Prominence was the strongest predictor of an increase in Activism intentions over time, while no goal significantly predicted change in Radicalism (see Supplementary Section 6).

Constructs From Past Theories of Political Ideology (Studies 4-5). Relationships with constructs from past theories is

summarized in Table 7 (for Conservative constructs) and Table 8 (for Liberal constructs). See Supplemental Section 5 for discussion of subscales and hypothesis-irrelevant constructs.

We first hypothesized that Elitism would be more strongly correlated with SDO (relative to other goals). This hypothesis received partial support. Elitism's correlation with SDO was the most strongly positive in summary analyses and significantly stronger than Inclusiveness, Rebellion, and Disrepute's correlations. However, it was not significantly stronger than Tradition or Prominence's correlations. Thus, SDO overlaps strongly not only with Elitism (as hypothesized), but also with Tradition and Prominence. Beyond this, Elitism was also significantly related to Authoritarian Aggression. Given that the items on the Authoritarian Aggression scale directly refer to support for violence, this suggests that Elitism has divisive consequences.

We next hypothesized that Tradition would be the goal most strongly correlated with the seemingly desirable constructs of the Binding Foundations and Social Order Motives, as well as the seemingly undesirable construct of RWA

Table 7. Relationship Between Goal-Commitments and Conservative Attitudes/Morals, Studies 4 and 5.

Study	Elitism	Tradition	Inclusiveness	Rebellion	Prominence	Disrepute
Social Dominance Orientation						
S4	.36 _a [.25, .46]	.25 _b [.13, .36]	-.42 _b [-.51, -.31]	-.05 _b [-.17, .08]	.27 [.15, .38]	.20 _b [.08, .31]
S5	.19 _a [.08, .30]	.21 [.10, .32]	-.43 _b [-.52, -.33]	-.18 _b [-.29, -.07]	.12 [.01, .24]	.06 _b [-.06, .18]
MM	.27 _a [.19, .35]	.23 [.15, .31]	-.43 _b [-.49, -.35]	-.12 _b [-.20, -.03]	.19 [.11, .27]	.13 _b [.04, .21]
Authoritarian Aggression (ASC)						
S4	.22 [.10, .33]	.43 _a [.32, .52]	-.35 _b [-.45, -.23]	-.24 _b [-.35, -.12]	.19 _b [.07, .30]	.04 _b [-.09, .16]
S5	.23 [.11, .34]	.36 _a [.25, .46]	-.28 _b [-.38, -.17]	-.28 _b [-.38, -.17]	.12 _b [.00, .23]	.00 _b [-.12, .12]
MM	.23 _b [.14, .30]	.39 _a [.32, .46]	-.31 _b [-.39, -.24]	-.26 _b [-.34, -.18]	.15 _b [.07, .24]	.02 _b [-.07, .10]
Authoritarian Submission (ASC)						
S4	.29 [.18, .40]	.47 _a [.36, .56]	-.17 _b [-.29, -.05]	-.25 _b [-.36, -.13]	.17 _b [.05, .29]	.09 _b [-.03, .21]
S5	.26 [.15, .37]	.31 _a [.20, .41]	-.04 _b [-.16, .08]	-.22 _b [-.33, -.11]	.15 _b [.03, .26]	.05 _b [-.07, .16]
MM	.27 _b [.19, .35]	.39 _a [.32, .46]	-.10 _b [-.19, -.02]	-.23 _b [-.31, -.15]	.16 _b [.08, .24]	.07 _b [-.02, .15]
Conventionalism (ASC)						
S4	.10 _b [-.02, .22]	.66_a [.58, .72]	-.18 _b [-.29, -.06]	-.46 _b [-.55, -.36]	.25 _b [.13, .36]	-.19 _b [-.30, -.06]
S5	.15 _b [.04, .26]	.62_a [.54, .69]	-.13 _b [-.24, -.01]	-.46 _b [-.54, -.36]	.08 _b [-.04, .20]	-.08 _b [-.20, .04]
MM	.13 _b [.04, .21]	.64_a [.59, .69]	-.15 _b [-.24, -.07]	-.46 _b [-.52, -.39]	.16 _b [.08, .24]	-.13 _b [-.22, -.05]
Right-Wing Authoritarianism						
S4	.27 _b [.15, .38]	.57_a [.48, .65]	-.33 _b [-.44, -.22]	-.39 _b [-.49, -.28]	.22 _b [.10, .34]	.01 _b [-.11, .13]
S5	.24 _b [.13, .35]	.57_a [.49, .64]	-.26 _b [-.37, -.15]	-.47 _b [-.56, -.37]	.10 _b [-.02, .22]	-.03 _b [-.15, .09]
MM	.25 _b [.17, .33]	.57_a [.51, .62]	-.29 _b [-.37, -.21]	-.43 _b [-.50, -.36]	.16 _b [.07, .24]	-.01 _b [-.10, .07]
Binding Moral Foundations						
S4	-.10 _b [-.22, .02]	.33_a [.21, .43]	-.06 _b [-.18, .07]	-.38 _b [-.48, -.27]	-.01 _b [-.14, .11]	-.21 _b [-.33, -.10]
S5	.01 _b [-.10, .13]	.39_a [.28, .48]	.04 _b [-.08, .16]	-.37 _b [-.47, -.27]	-.07 _b [-.18, .05]	-.17 _b [-.28, -.05]
MM	-.04 _b [-.13, .04]	.36_a [.29, .43]	-.01 _b [-.09, .08]	-.37 _b [-.45, -.30]	-.04 _b [-.13, .04]	-.19 _b [-.27, -.11]
Social Order Moral Motives						
S4	.32 _b [.21, .43]	.57_a [.49, .65]	-.14 _b [-.26, -.02]	-.30 _b [-.41, -.19]	.37 _b [.26, .47]	-.01 _b [-.13, .11]
S5	.21 _b [.09, .32]	.57_a [.49, .65]	-.12 _b [-.23, .00]	-.41 _b [-.50, -.31]	.10 _b [-.02, .21]	-.05 _b [-.16, .07]
MM	.26 _b [.18, .34]	.57_a [.51, .62]	-.13 _b [-.21, -.05]	-.36 _b [-.43, -.28]	.23 _b [.15, .31]	-.03 _b [-.12, .05]

Note. Subscript “a” indicates the correlation hypothesized to be strongest in each row; subscript “b” indicates a correlation that was significantly lower than “a”; bold font indicates a fully supported hypothesis; underlined font indicates a partially supported hypothesis. S = Study; MM = Mini-Meta-analysis; ASC = Aggression-Submission-Conventionalism.

Table 8. Relationships Between Goal-Commitments and Liberal Attitudes/Morals.

Study	Elitism	Tradition	Inclusiveness	Rebellion	Prominence	Disrepute
Social Justice Moral Motives						
S4	-.18b [-.30, -.06]	-.23b [-.34, -.11]	.43a [.32, .52]	.18b [.06, .30]	-.03b [-.16, .09]	-.07b [-.19, .05]
S5	-.20b [-.31, -.09]	-.19b [-.30, -.07]	.41a [.31, .51]	.20b [.09, .31]	-.06b [-.17, .06]	-.03b [-.14, .09]
MM	-.19b [-.27, -.11]	-.21b [-.29, -.13]	.42a [.35, .49]	.19b [.11, .27]	-.05b [-.13, .04]	-.05b [-.13, .04]
Not-Harming Moral Motives						
S4	-.31b [-.41, -.19]	.15b [.02, .26]	.36a [.25, .46]	-.18b [-.29, -.06]	-.08b [-.20, .04]	-.33b [-.43, -.22]
S5	-.22b [-.33, -.10]	.16b [.04, .27]	.33a [.22, .43]	-.12b [-.23, .00]	-.11b [-.23, .00]	-.26b [-.36, -.15]
MM	-.26b [-.34, -.18]	.16b [.07, .24]	.34a [.27, .42]	-.15b [-.23, -.06]	-.10 [-.18, -.01]	-.29b [-.37, -.21]
Helping/Fairness Moral Motives						
S4	-.34b [-.45, -.23]	.19b [.07, .31]	.39a [.29, .49]	-.23b [-.35, -.11]	-.06b [-.18, .06]	-.42b [-.52, -.31]
S5	-.24b [-.35, -.12]	.26b [.14, .36]	.44a [.34, .53]	-.15b [-.27, -.04]	-.05b [-.17, .07]	-.31b [-.41, -.20]
MM	-.29b [-.36, -.21]	.23b [.14, .31]	.42a [.34, .48]	-.19b [-.27, -.11]	-.05b [-.14, .03]	-.36b [-.44, -.29]
Individualizing Moral Foundations						
S4	-.25b [-.36, -.13]	.08 [-.04, .20]	.14a [.01, .25]	-.19b [-.30, -.07]	-.14b [-.26, -.02]	-.23b [-.34, -.11]
S5	-.13b [-.24, -.01]	.12 [.00, .24]	.19a [.08, .30]	-.15b [-.27, -.04]	-.14b [-.26, -.03]	-.18b [-.29, -.06]
MM	-.19b [-.27, -.11]	.10 [.02, .18]	.17a [.08, .25]	-.17b [-.25, -.09]	-.14b [-.22, -.06]	-.20b [-.28, -.12]
Left Wing Authoritarianism						
S4	.02b [-.10, .15]	-.38b [-.48, -.27]	.16b [.04, .28]	.32a [.21, .43]	.02b [-.10, .15]	.16b [.03, .27]
S5	.06b [-.06, .17]	-.38b [-.48, -.28]	.14 [.02, .25]	.29a [.18, .40]	.12b [.00, .23]	.11b [-.01, .23]
MM	.04b [-.04, .13]	-.38b [-.45, -.30]	.15b [.07, .23]	.30a [.23, .38]	.07b [-.01, .16]	.13b [.05, .22]

Note. See Table 7 for explanatory notes. MM = Mini-Meta-analysis.

(especially Conventionalism). As can be seen in Table 7, all hypotheses received clear support. Within Dunwoody and Funke's (2016) Aggression-Submission-Conventionalism (ASC) scale, Tradition was most strongly related to the Conventionalism facet. Nonetheless, it was also clearly associated with the Authoritarian Submission and Aggression, and these correlations were stronger than all other goals in summary analyses.

We next hypothesized Inclusiveness goals would be most strongly correlated with Social Justice motives, the Individualizing Foundations, and the conceptually similar Moral Motives of Not-Harming and Helping/Fairness. All hypotheses involving the Measure of Moral Motives were strongly supported (see Table 8). Inclusiveness' correlations with Social Justice, Helping/Fairness, and Not-Harming Motives were significant and significantly stronger than

other goals in all analyses. However, the correlation between Inclusiveness and the Individualizing Foundations were more modest in magnitude and not significantly stronger than Tradition's correlation. It is likely that this is due to the Moral Foundations Sacredness scale's focus on intuitive reactions, while the Measure of Moral Motives is focused on goal-commitments (like the PINT Goals scale).

Finally, we hypothesized that Rebellion goals would most strongly correlate with LWA. This hypothesis was supported in the mini-meta-analysis. Although Inclusiveness was also significantly related to LWA, this effect was significantly smaller than Rebellion's correlation.

Dimensions of Generalized Prejudice. Table 9 summarizes the relationship between goal-commitments and dimensions of generalized prejudice. Here, we first hypothesized that

Table 9. Relationship Between Goal-Commitments and Dimensions of Generalized Prejudice.

Dimension of prejudice	Study	Elitism	Tradition	Inclusiveness	Rebellion	Prominence	Disrepute
Disadvantaged	S4	.26a [.14, .37]	-.13b [-.25, -.01]	-.37b [-.47, -.26]	.09b [-.03, .21]	.13b [.01, .25]	.26 [.14, .37]
	S5	.14a [.03, .26]	-.21b [-.32, -.09]	-.34b [-.44, -.24]	.05 [-.07, .17]	.05 [-.06, .17]	.16 [.04, .27]
	MM	.20a [.12, .28]	-.17b [-.25, -.09]	-.36b [-.43, -.28]	.07b [-.01, .15]	.09b [.01, .17]	.20 [.12, .28]
Unconventional	S4	.21 [.09, .32]	.32a [.20, .42]	-.41b [-.51, -.31]	-.27b [-.38, -.15]	.16b [.04, .28]	.03b [-.09, .15]
	S5	.10 [-.02, .21]	.25a [.14, .36]	-.40b [-.50, -.30]	-.32b [-.42, -.21]	.01b [-.11, .12]	-.04b [-.16, .08]
	MM	.15b [.07, .23]	.29a [.21, .36]	-.41b [-.48, -.34]	-.29b [-.37, -.21]	.08b [.00, .17]	-.01b [-.09, .08]
Dangerous	S4	-.29b [-.39, -.17]	.14a [.01, .25]	-.05b [-.17, .07]	-.33b [-.44, -.22]	-.11b [-.23, .01]	-.33b [-.44, -.22]
	S5	-.09b [-.20, .03]	.27a [.16, .38]	-.11b [-.22, .01]	-.38b [-.47, -.27]	.04a [-.08, .15]	-.31b [-.41, -.20]
	MM	-.18b [-.27, -.10]	.21a [.13, .29]	-.08b [-.16, .01]	-.36b [-.43, -.28]	-.03b [-.12, .05]	-.32b [-.40, -.24]
Conservative	S4	-.12b [-.24, .00]	-.46b [-.55, -.36]	.13 [.01, .25]	.24a [.12, .35]	-.15b [-.27, -.03]	.08b [-.04, .20]
	S5	-.04b [-.16, .07]	-.47b [-.56, -.37]	.01b [-.11, .13]	.30a [.18, .40]	-.10b [-.22, .02]	.13b [.02, .25]
	MM	-.08b [-.17, .00]	-.46b [-.53, -.39]	.07b [-.01, .15]	.27a [.19, .35]	-.13b [-.21, -.04]	.11b [.03, .19]

Note. See Table 7 for explanatory notes. MM = Moral Motives.

Elitism would be more strongly correlated with Prejudice against Disadvantaged groups (e.g., Black and Physically Disabled individuals), relative to other goals, as this form of prejudice helps to sustain group-based hierarchy. This hypothesis received relatively strong, but not full support. This correlation was consistently significant, positive, and significantly stronger than all other focal goal-commitments. Nonetheless, it was similar in magnitude to the correlation with Disrepute. It is possible that this Prejudice measure is contaminated by a general dislike of others, which is plausibly related to Disrepute. Future research should test this by using procedures that better separate general dislike from group-specific prejudices (Bergh & Brandt, 2021).

We next hypothesized that Tradition would be most strongly correlated with Prejudice against Unconventional groups (e.g., Gay men, Lesbian women) and Dangerous groups (e.g., Criminals), as these groups challenge the conventional order. This hypothesis was ultimately supported. Although Elitism was also significantly correlated with Prejudice against Unconventional Groups, the hypothesized correlation with Tradition was stronger in the mini-meta-analysis.

Finally, we hypothesized that Rebellion would be more strongly related to Prejudice against Conservative/Privileged groups (e.g., Republicans, Rich people). This hypothesis was ultimately supported. Although Inclusiveness was also significantly related to anti-Conservative prejudice in Study 4, this

correlation ultimately proved to be unreliable and smaller than Rebellion's correlation in the mini-meta-analysis.

Discussion

When a person describes themselves as “conservative” or “liberal,” an important aspect of what they are communicating is their *goals* for how they want society to be structured. Yet what exactly are these goals? Past work (Altemeyer, 1981; Graham et al., 2018) has described them in dramatically different fashions, leading to debates and allegations of bias (Duarte et al., 2015; Kugler et al., 2014). To help move the field past this impasse, we systematically compared a broad, representative sample of all possible higher-order goals to the political ideology of American adults. We focused on items selected to represent the major dimensions of goal-content found in a previous lexical investigation of more than 1,000 goals (Wilkowski et al., 2020, 2022) and compared these goals with political ideology, voting behavior, collective action intentions, constructs from past theories, and dimensions of generalized prejudice.

The results suggested that proposals from past, competing theories are all partially correct. Conservatism is related to both the generally desirable value of Tradition and the generally-undesirable vice of Elitism. Likewise, liberalism is related to both the generally desirable value of Inclusiveness

and the generally-undesirable vice of Rebellion. Although some specific hypotheses were not fully supported, this broad framework was. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these findings in separate sections below.

Some Conservative Goals Are More Generally Desirable Than Others. There is now a great deal of evidence that RWA and SDO are distinguishable social attitudes related to conservatism (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). For example, past research suggests that they reflect different values, with RWA reflecting greater *Conservation values* (and less *Openness-to-Change* values), and SDO reflecting greater *Self-Enhancement values* (and less *Self-Transcendence* values) (Duriez & Van Hiel, 2002). Importantly, though, this past research only examined *values* and did not consider *vices*. By also including vices, the current investigation revealed a more fundamental distinction. While RWA reflects the value of Tradition, SDO reflects less generally desirable goals, such as Elitism. This suggests that some aspects of RWA are truly valued by the average American, but this is less true of SDO.

More specific findings paint a more detailed picture. When different facets of RWA were distinguished, the *Conventionalism* (i.e., “Right-Wing”) facet was most strongly related to Tradition values; while the *Authoritarian Aggression and Submission* (i.e., “Authoritarian”) facets were more weakly related. This suggests that the average member of society values the right wing’s emphasis on upholding Conventions, but true authoritarianism is less valued.

In contrast to our original, straightforward hypothesis, results suggested that SDO is related to multiple goals. SDO was clearly related to Elitism (consistent with hypotheses). Unexpectedly, though, SDO also showed statistically equivalent relationships with the Values of Prominence and Tradition. This could suggest that some aspects of SDO are more devalued than others. For example, the desires to empower *one’s ingroup* (rather than one’s self) and make it *authentically more capable* may reflect values (e.g., Tradition & Prominence). However, the willingness to use force if others do not comply may reflect a generally-undesirable vice (i.e., Elitism).

The Shared Motivational Basis of RWA and the Binding Moral Foundations. Beyond this, the current investigation has novel implications for debates between advocates of Moral Foundations Theory (Graham et al., 2018) and critics of it who largely support System Justification Theory (e.g., Jost, 2021; Kugler et al., 2014). Moral Foundation theory suggests that the Binding Foundations serve a useful societal function, as they unite individuals into moral communities. In contrast, critics suggest that the Binding foundations are a reflection of the authoritarian personality, and link them to divisive consequences (e.g., prejudice; Kugler et al., 2014). The current investigation adds to this conversation by presenting evidence that RWA and the Binding Foundations both reflect

the same motivation. Both the Binding Foundations and RWA are strongly related to Tradition values, suggesting strong conceptual overlap between these constructs.

Yet what exactly do these results *mean* for the wider debate? When answering this question, the current results cut both ways. First, results involving the ASC scale (Dunwoody & Funke, 2016) suggest that Tradition is more strongly related to the Conventionalism than to the Authoritarian Aggression or Submission. This could be seen as support for Moral Foundations theory, as the motivation underlying the Binding Foundations appears to be more strongly related to advocacy for “Right-Wing” views, rather than to the defining aspects of “Authoritarianism.”

Nonetheless, this case should not be overstated. Tradition is a highly parochial goal. Although it is primarily focused on benefiting one’s ingroup, it, nonetheless, involves a willingness to harm the outgroup when necessary to benefit the ingroup. Consistent with this, Tradition is significantly associated with Authoritarian Aggression and Submission. Although it more weakly related to these constructs than Conventionalism, it is also more strongly correlated with Authoritarian Aggression and Submission than any other goal examined. Perhaps more importantly, Tradition values were clearly related to Prejudice against Unconventional groups (e.g., the LGBTQ+ community, feminists). Thus, Tradition should be understood as a double-edged sword. While it may have benefits for binding select individuals into an ingroup, it also can lead to disadvantaging outgroup members.

On the Unifying Values of Liberalism. The current investigation also has implications for the debate between Moral Foundations theory (Graham et al., 2018) and the Model of Moral Motives (Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013). While Moral Foundations theory initially claimed that liberals have no moral foundation that “binds” them into a community, the Model of Moral Motives later countered that liberals rely on Social Justice motives for this. On this issue, the current findings clearly support the Model of Moral Motives. Inclusiveness is a value that was identified as a unique construct in a bottom-up investigation of goal-descriptive nouns in American English (Wilkowski et al., 2020). It is clearly related to theoretically derived measures of Social Justice motives, as well as Helping/Fairness and Not-Harming motives, and it is strongly related to liberalism.

Perhaps more importantly, there was evidence suggesting the Inclusiveness values actually help to “bind” people into a community. All too often, the proposal that Purity, Ingroup Loyalty, and Respect for Authority help to bind people into communities is taken at face value, with little direct evidence offered. In contrast to this, we present evidence that Inclusiveness is not related to any dimension of generalized prejudice found to date. It is unrelated to prejudice against the political outgroup (i.e., conservatives). It is also related to willingness to engage in collective action. Importantly, though,

this willingness takes a nonviolent form (i.e., activism, not radicalism). This pattern stands in stark contrast to Tradition, which was related to Prejudice against Unconventional groups, as well as Authoritarian Submission and Aggression.

Are Authoritarianism and Prejudice Unique to the Right-Wing? The current investigation also has novel implications for debates about whether authoritarianism and prejudice are uniquely linked to the right-wing (e.g., Badaan & Jost, 2020; Nilsson & Jost, 2020), or also extend to the left-wing (Brandt et al., 2014; Conway et al., 2018). While the current findings suggest that Inclusiveness is a unifying, liberal value, we also find that Rebellion is a division, liberal vice. Its correlates suggest it may very well have divisive consequences. Rebellion is related to Prejudice against Conservative groups, willingness to engage in violent collective action (i.e., radicalism), and LWA.

What then are we to make of these findings? Does Rebellion truly reflect a left-wing version of Authoritarianism? If so, it may seem like a strange breed of authoritarianism to many—authoritarianism aimed at defying and overthrowing authority. Nonetheless, Costello et al. (2022) recently noted that a surprisingly large number of dictatorial regimes include the word “Revolutionary” in their name, typically to suggest that they are fighting to overcome injustices committed by previous regimes. Certainly, more careful research on the topic is needed, but Rebellion goals may very well motivate submission to one authority figure, if they promise to correct injustices created by prior authorities.

More generally, though, Rebellion appears to be a liberal goal that is linked with greater animosity against conservatives. While this is clearly not as problematic as other forms of prejudice (e.g., against historically disadvantaged groups), there remain ways in which Rebellion and anti-Conservative prejudice are divisive. Rather than building bridges between different groups, they create divisions and drive people apart. They can add to the polarized environment in which hostilities between the left and right flare more brightly.

Practical Implications for Advancing Inclusiveness and Overcoming Prejudice. Ultimately, though, each of the abovementioned theoretical debates must be understood in light of broader societal issues. Since RWA and SDO were initially proposed to understand and overcome prejudice against historically disadvantaged groups, one important question is how the current investigation advances this goal. In this respect, it provides three useful insights.

First, Inclusiveness is a goal that many people (and even many self-described conservatives) are committed to approaching. The simple insight should not be overlooked, as prior theories many times emphasize goals antagonistic to inclusiveness (e.g., self-enhancement, system justification). It suggests that interventions designed to close the intention–behavior gap (Sheeran & Webb, 2016) may be highly effective at promoting inclusive behaviors.

Second, the current investigation suggests that some forms of prejudice (e.g., against disadvantaged groups) appear to be driven by a commitment to approach generally-undesirable vices (e.g., Elitism). Thus, interventions aimed at changing participants’ goals and motivations may be needed. Research on the internalization of societal values may be useful in this regard (e.g., Deci et al., 1994; Kochanska & Aksan, 2006).

Finally, other forms of prejudice (e.g., against gay men & lesbian women) appear to be driven by generally desirable values (such as Tradition). This finding is in some ways more disturbing, as it suggests some prejudices are socially sanctioned. As cultural traditions (in some form) are widely valued and arguably necessary for cultures to function (e.g., Kashima, 2008), it is unlikely that interventions designed to elicit widespread reductions in commitment to Tradition would be successful. Instead, it may be more useful to reflect on the larger function that traditions serve. Cultural conventions are widely understood as providing “common ground,” which allows people to coordinate their actions and achieve shared goals (Fitzsimons & Finkel, 2018; Higgins et al., 2021; Kashima, 2008) in a cognitively simple manner (Eidelman & Crandall, 2012). In the United States, cultural traditions systematically disadvantage certain groups, but this is not necessarily the case. It is quite possible for societies to develop conventions that provide straightforward guidance on how members of different groups can interact in an equitable fashion (e.g., Singapore—Roets et al., 2015; the tribes of the pre-Columbian Iroquois federation—Fry, 2012). All too often, norms for intergroup interaction are constantly changing and difficult to understand (e.g., the evolution of the LGBT acronym into LGBTQIA2S+). Providing simple, clear, and stable guidelines may help to bring Tradition goals into alignment with Inclusiveness.

Limitations and the Need for Future Research

The current investigation focused solely on Americans, so it will be critical to examine the generalizability of these findings to other cultures. While the current studies employed samples that were diverse in many ways, it would nonetheless be useful to examine these hypotheses in a truly representative American sample and to examine variation across different subgroups.

Furthermore, some results were not hypothesized and require further investigation. In Study 3, pre-election Prominence goals were unexpectedly the only significant predictor of increased Activism intentions. It is possible that this occurred because Time 2 data were collected only days after results were called, when a person could effectively “lead the way” by calling for peaceful protest. Inclusiveness, Rebellion, Tradition, and Elitism may only predict change in collective action intentions when broader-based social movements start to coalesce. Future research is needed to examine these possibilities (e.g., involving more longitudinal follow-ups).

Despite these limitations, the current studies provide an important first step, as this is the first investigation to comprehensively compare goals in a data-driven fashion to political ideology and prejudice.

Conclusion

When a person indicates that they are “liberal” or “conservative,” an important part of what they are communicating is their *goals* for how they would like society to be structured. Yet past theories have described these goals in dramatically different ways, proposing that either conservatism or liberalism reflects a divisive or unifying goal. This has led to debates and allegations of bias. To help the field overcome this impasse, we systematically compared a broad, representative sample of all possible higher-order goals to the political ideology of American adults. Results suggest that proposals from past, opposing theories are all partially correct. Conservatism simultaneously reflects the unifying goal of Tradition, as well as the divisive goal of Elitism. Similarly, Liberalism simultaneously reflects the unifying goal of Inclusiveness, and the divisive goal of Rebellion.

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Data Availability Statement

Data, Analytic Code, Verbatim Method files, and Supplement are available at <https://osf.io/3xrv5/>.

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ORCID iD

Benjamin M. Wilkowski  <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3630-4706>

Supplemental Material

Supplemental material is available online with this article.

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