The University remains committed to supporting meaningful international research collaborations while ensuring that such collaborations do not negatively impact the ability of individual researchers or the University to obtain future funding. Therefore, the Research and Economic Development Division’s (REDD) reviews all formal and informal international research collaborations for potential risks to individual researchers and the University’s ability to receive funding.
U.S. government agencies and federal research sponsors closely scrutinize whether engagements with foreign entities and individuals, particularly in the form of research funding, gifts, and collaborations, comply with U.S. laws and regulations. Their concerns center on national security and the potential for valuable intellectual property and other research resources to be transferred inappropriately and sometimes illegally to foreign nations.
On August 25, 2025, the U.S. Department of Education, National Counterintelligence and Security Center, and other federal partners issued guidance in a joint bulletin, “Safeguarding Academia: Protecting Fundamental Research, Intellectual Property, Critical Technologies, and the U.S. Research Ecosystem.” The bulletin names China explicitly as the top threat. It also describes favorite “targets” of foreign adversaries that seek to undermine U.S. national security:
- Students, faculty, researchers, and administrators with access to research and technical information
- Pre-publication research results and data
- Proprietary techniques and processes
- Research and laboratory procedures
- Practical knowledge and technical expertise
- Laboratory equipment, software, and computing resources
- Physical and virtual access protocols and passwords
- Budget estimates and grant information
- Prototypes or blueprints
- Student, employee, customer, or U.S. person data
All of this has led representatives from the FBI, State Department, Commerce Department, and other agencies to visit campuses at a breakneck pace, to seek information, offer tips, and generate dialogue to stay vigilant about inappropriate foreign activity.
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Talent Recruitment Programs
There have been numerous cases of US-based researchers, including both US citizens and foreign nationals, being recruited directly or indirectly by foreign governments with the intended goal of exploiting the open nature of the research and development environment at US universities and government agencies. Specifically, Talent Recruitment Programs refer to initiatives undertaken by foreign-state entities to engage and attract scientists, engineers, academics, researchers, and entrepreneurs of all nationalities working or educated in the United States to join the foreign-sponsored program and transfer their knowledge and expertise to the foreign state. While this alone may not be problematic, it is often coupled with nefarious intentions that may cause a researcher to violate University, state, or federal regulations.
Malign Foreign Talent Recruitment Programs
Consistent with the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022, federal agencies prohibit funding to a researcher that is participating in a Malign Foreign Talent Recruitment Program (MFTRP). How do you know if an arrangement is a MFTRP?
Foreign Visitors
A review of all potential foreign visitors is part of a comprehensive approach to research security outlined in NSPM-33. The review will include, but is not limited to, the purpose of the visit, the length of the visit, the UW facilities and equipment involved, and a review of the potential visitor’s affiliations. Please contact export@uwyo.edu with a copy of the potential visitor’s curriculum vitae and a completed Visitor Agreement before issuing a letter of invitation or accepting a request to visit.
International Travel
Proper preparation and essential guidance can help reduce the risk of compromising institutional intellectual data while traveling. According to UW SAP 7-9.4 and 7-9.8, all University travel requires prior authorization. However, travel to a country on the U.S. Department of State’s list of “Countries of Particular Concern” requires additional review before it can be authorized.
Grant requirements may include a requirement for covered individuals to complete foreign travel security training before international travel. Department of Defense funding may even require agency approval before any foreign travel.
